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THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF
"EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS"
JOHN P. FRANK AND ROBERT F. MUNRO*
When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the gentleman?**
I. INTRODUCTION
The equal protection explosion of the past twenty years has been the
Constitution's equivalent of the atomic bomb. To change the meta-
* John P. Frank, B.A., 1938, M.A., LL.B., 1940, University of Wisconsin; J.S.D.,
1947, Yale University. Robert F. Munro, B.S., 1940, Purdue University; J.D., 1949,
Indiana University.
This paper is an update of an article of the same name by these authors in
50 COLUMBIA LAw Rvmw 131 (1950), several sections of which are substantially
reproduced here by permission. At that time it was done in connection with the then
pending case in the United States Supreme Court of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950) in which they were amici. Mr. Munro is Judge of the Superior Court,
Lafayette, Indiana, and Mr. Frank is a practicing attorney in Phoenix, Arizona. Mr.
Chester H. Johnson, a law student at Arizona State University, has aided in the 1972
revision.
The 1950 article covered all then discovered original material. The leading second-
ary works available to the authors at that time included H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF
THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) (present edition reprinted 1965); J. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF Tm FOURTEENTHr AMENDMENT (1956) (used in manuscript form in
1950); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rnv. 5 (1949); Graham, The "Conspiracy
Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938).
The contributions to this field since 1950 have been large. See, e.g., G. CRossKEY,
POLrrics AND THE CONSTrrTTION 1083-1118 (1953); R. HARRIs, THE QUEsT FOR
EQUAL=TY 24-36 (1960); J. TENBRoEK, EQUALITY UNDER LAW (1965) (first edition
published in 1951 under title: THE ANTIsLAvERY ORIGINs OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1955); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. (1954); Graham,
The Early Antislavery Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. Rv.
479, 610; Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3
(1954). Regrettably, this kind of listing fails to salute some real accomplishments.
The Graham work in particular is deeply illuminating of the growth of the intellectual
understructure of abolitionism.
** Sullivan, The Antecedents of the Declaration of Independence, 1 ANN. REP.
AM. HAsT. Ass'N 65, 80 (1902). The author credits this jingle, originating about
the time of Wat Tyler's rebellion, as the first popularization of the idea of the equality
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phor, in 1950 equal protection was a minor stream, a kind of lesser
tributary in a flowing constitutional law. Today it is the Mississippi.
The race relations revolution and one man-one vote are the lasting
heritage of the Earl Warren years on the Supreme Court. Much else
was important, but these are vast. They permit no turning back; so
far as such things are ever predictable, these immense changes are for-
ever. Nor are they the end; now equal protection spreads to the law of
poverty as well. These are the contemporary applications of equal
protection of the laws. They are the manifestation of equal protection
one hundred years after the amendment of which it is a part.
We shall talk about the history of that constitutional provision here,
but we must add perspective to history. The phrase is only a part of
a section of the amendment. It cannot be completely isolated; to see
its history whole, one must necessarily put it into the context of the
amendment as a whole.
Further, so that we do not exaggerate the importance of our inquiry,
we must look at the relationship of the history itself to the immense
events of the past two decades. Has the history either unleashed or
restrained the great events of these years? Has it merely been neutral?
To describe the Civil War as the Second American Revolution is apt
enough, and yet the label obscures reality. This was a two-way revolu-
tion. Specifically it was the revolt by the southern region against the
established government; but it quickly became as well a revolt of
northern forces against southern hegemony in government. Jefferson
Davis revolted against Thaddeus Stevens, but in the course of a hard
war, Thad Stevens was also revolting against Davis and all he stood for.
This revolution was, in the most awful and real sense, a revolution
of guns and death, a true military convulsion. As is customary with
revolutions, it discarded much of the legal system which it found, and
substituted a legal order of its own. The three Civil War amendments,
of man and attributes its popularity to Wycliffe. The same conception was of course,
current among intellectuals many centuries earlier. See the valuable work of F. WOR-
MUTH, TnE ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTITUIONALISM c. 2 (1949). The conception of
equality as the bedrock of liberty is everywhere; see for relations of Locke and the
Declaration of Independence to abolitionism, J. TENBRoEK, EQUALrrY UNDER THE LANW(1965). For another of the endless illustrations, the Easter Monday, 1916, call to
the Easter rebellion in Ireland, declares that "The Republic guarantees religious and
civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunity to all its citizens ... " From un-
published reprint.
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adopted both to take and to perpetuate the fruits of the revolution for
the victors, were the charter of the new order. Reconstruction was the
device of the victors to govern the conquered territory, a device not
radically different from the immediate post-World War II occupations.
The termination of the reconstruction was the great counterrevolu-
tion. While revolutions are normally of violence, violence, while like-
ly, is not essential. Revolution by force unseated and beheaded
Charles I and ruled the country; the Glorious Revolution of 1688 put
an end to the Stuarts a second time and forever without any war at all.
So in America, the Second American Revolution unseated southern
power and utterly changed the complexion of the country. Recon-
struction enforced the new mandate. The counterrevolution, ending
without significant military action, set the country on a new path as
surely as did the accession of William and Mary in England 200 years
before.
These changing seasons of government, in very rapid order, domi-
nated the development of the fourteenth amendment. Nowhere is this
rapidity more dramatic than the course of events relating to the Ne-
groes. In 1860, slavery was solidly entrenched in the United States.
In a short five years had come the progression: the freeing of slaves
used for military purposes by the army; the prohibition against re-
turning slaves who crossed Union lines; the termination of slavery in
the District of Columbia; the abandonment of fugitive slave laws; the
Emancipation Proclamation; the first equal rights laws for the District
of Columbia; the establishment of schools for all in the District; the
admission of Negroes into the military forces; the elimination of restric-
tions against Negroes carrying the mails; the prohibitions of exclusion
of Negroes from transportation in the District; and the thirteenth
amendment itself.'
Two more amendments, the fourteenth and fifteenth, quickly fol-
lowed. They were accompanied by a series of civil rights acts and by
active reconstruction aimed at establishing Negro freedom in the South.
This program met incredibly large obstacles to effectiveness, including
the southern resistance, the discovery by many of the northern bloc
that their interests were best served by collaboration and numerous
other factors. These led to the abandonment of the whole effort to
1. The summary is taken from H1 WMSON, HisroRY o ANn-SLAvERY MEAsunES
1861-65, at 346-52 (1865).
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dominate the South by troops or by law after 1877, when the counter-
revolution had prevailed.
This means that the entirety of the active life of the Second Ameri-
can Revolution was, realistically, from about 1861 to 1877 at the out-
side. Insofar as the period of turbulent reform was directed at slavery,
the active years may be measured as January 1, 1863 (Emancipation
Proclamation) to the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In terms of sheer
time span, comparison with other revolutions shows a highly compara-
ble active life, a period of overwhelming dominance followed in these
instances by exhaustion of early dynamism and a replacement by an-
other form of government.
BEGIN END YEAR SPAN
Puritan Revolution in England 1641 1660 19
American Revolution, Lexington to
Constitutional Government 1775 1789 14
French Revolution to
Napoleon's Empire 1789 1804 15
Civil War to End of
Reconstruction 1861 1877 16
It is a quality of revolution that events reshape the law rather than
that the law controls the revolution.
This reshaping of the law by the Second American Revolution gave
birth to the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments as the new
American Constitution. They were the legal structure for consolidat-
ing, perpetuating, and controlling the results of that revolution. They
were as radical in their conception as the 1791 revolutionary constitu-
tion of France.
The counterrevolution derailed the amendments as an instrument for
perpetuating the revolution. Any effort to comprehend the history of
the fourteenth amendment in the last third of the nineteenth century
and the first half of the twentieth by purporting to relate it to original
purposes is simply hopeless. It altogether fails to take into account
that the counterrevolution changed the legal system fundamentally,
just as the amendments themselves changed the system which they re-
placed.
Speaking broadly, the function of the thirteenth amendment was to
free the slaves. Prior to that amendment there were two principal cate-
[Vol. 1972:421
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gories of persons in the United States, the slave and the free.2 Eman-
cipation did not necessarily move the Negroes from the one class to the
other. In ancient civilizations, "the world was not a place in-
habited solely by free persons and slaves. Between men of these ex-
tremes of status stood special classes which lived outside the boundary
of slavery but not yet within the circle of those who might rightly be
called free."'3  In this respect, antiquity might be reproduced, and a
new class might be created by which the ex-slave would be placed in a
social limbo, equivalent perhaps to that of the less happy castes of In-
dia. If the range of status from slavery to complete freedom may be
thought of as a scale, the reconstruction generation had to decide
where within that scale the freedman should be placed.
The driving force of the thirteenth amendment was something more
than to strike off the manacles and end the slave trade. Its key spon-
sors would have been appalled to discover that they were substituting
a caste system for a slave system. As Speaker of the House Schuyler
Colfax said in a speech at the opening of the 39th Congress, "I call
them free men, not freedmen";4 but the rest of the century never wit-
nessed the creation of truly free men.
The counterrevolution took full-fledged freedom out of the thir-
teenth amendment. It was thereafter applied to allow a caste system
holding Negroes as a separate group with permanent disabilities. 5 Not
until the most recent times has any legal significance been given to the
removal of the "badge of slavery," as distinguished from slavery itself.'
The fifteenth amendment is the last of the three, and this is no acci-
dent. As other devices failed, this amendment was intended to give
the Negro the possibility of looking after himself as well as the oppor-
tunity of holding the Republican Party, as the Negro's instrument of
2. There was of course a small class of free Negroes in the North and South whose
status varied from state to state.
3. Westermann, Between Slavery and Freedom, 50 AM. Isr. REV. 213, 214
(1945).
4. 0. HOLLISTER, LWFE OF COLFAX 270-71 (1887).
5. The discussion here follows G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DmEMMA ch. 31
(1944).
6. Compare Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906); Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), with Griffen v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971); Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park, 396 U.S.
229, 235-36 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968);
United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485-86 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
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freedom, in office.7 After 1877, by one device or another, this policy
was robbed of all meaning until it was revived again in recent deci-
sions, new civil rights acts, and militant voter registration.8
We come then to the late nineteenth and pre-Warren twentieth cen-
tury interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. We do so realizing
that the thirteenth amendment for very nearly a hundred years had
been shrunk to its most minimal meaning, extinguishing slavery but
substituting a kind of serfdom, and that the fifteenth amendment had
been even more drastically reduced to a dead letter.
It is no surprise, therefore, to know that the fourteenth amendment,
after the counterrevolution, was so totally reshaped as to have only a
minimal resemblance, and at times not even that, to its original pur-
poses. The forces of counterrevolution here, too, were too strong for
the exhausted forces of the revolution. Like the thirteenth and fif-
teenth amendments, the fourteenth was not repealed. There was no
need. Rather, the successor social order demanded an entirely new
interpretation and this amendment, like the others, was rewritten by
interpretation to accommodate. Twenty-five years after each of the
three other revolutions tabulated above, there was little still alive of
the Articles of Confederation, or the French Constitution of 1791, or
Cromwell's Instrument of Government. In the same way, by 1900
there was not much left of the Second American Constitution.
The five sections of the fourteenth amendment deal with distin-
guishable problems:
Section 3 intended to keep out of federal public life all persons
who had previously taken oath to support the Constitution and then
engaged in the Civil War on the southern side. It evaporated four
7. This multiple point is made in many places; for illustration, see D. DONALD,
Ct1ARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 352 (1970).
8. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(holding pre-primary elections of a local political organization subject to fifteenth
amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding membership rules in
statewide Democratic Party subject to fifteenth amendment); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941) (holding that the right to vote in a state congressional primary
may be protected by Congress from private or state interference); Civil Rights Act of
1957, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Civil
Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, and 42 U.S.C.);
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-73p)
(Supp. IV 1969), as amended, Voting Rights Act Amendments, 84 Stat. 314, 315
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973) (1970).
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years from the effective date of the amendment, losing its consequence
with the Amnesty Act of 1872.1
Section 4 affirmed the public debt of the United States and pro-
vided that neither Confederate war debts nor any claims for loss or
emancipation of slaves should ever be paid. It has served as a per-
manent bar.
Section 2 was contemplated as a chief instrument of perpetual
Republican power. The most cynical portion of the amendment, it
walked the difficult line created by the fact that the victorious states
did not want Negroes to vote within their boundaries, while Negro
votes were essential to Republican dominance of future Congres-
sional elections in the South. The problem was intensified by the so-
called "three-fifths formula' of art. I, section 2 of the original Consti-
tution, which had counted three fifths of all slaves for the purpose of
calculating congressional representation. The thirteenth amendment
thus increased the Negro base of congressional representation by the ad-
ditional forty percent.
Section 2 of the fourteenth amendment reversed this, providing that
a state should lose as a basis for representation all Negroes not al-
lowed to vote. This, theoretically, solved all the problems. Northern
states could bar Negro voting at no cost, because the numbers were
too small to matter. The southern states could either let Negroes vote
and take the Republican consequences, or bar them and lose Congres-
sional seats.
The proposal was too smart by far. It was a dead letter from the
beginning, and never served either to aid Negro voting or diminish
representation. Indeed, its only practical effect was the opposite; it
did operate to increase southern representation by the forty percent.
The fifth section, providing that "The Congress shall have pow-
er to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article,"
was originally contemplated as the most important part of the amend-
ment, a matter to which this discussion will return. This hits the real
difference between the original Bill of Rights and the thirteenth, four-
teenth, and fifteenth amendments. The original Bill of Rights was
fundamentally preservative, its object being to protect what that gen-
eration conceived of as existing liberties. The Civil War amendments
9. Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 143.
Vol. 1972:421]
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were not merely protective, they were generative, intended to create
liberties for a vast class which did not have them at all, and section 5
was the energy of that generating system. It was much used until
1875, after which a process of narrow interpretation and outright in-
validation and destruction of its exercise reduced it to insignificance
until the civil rights acts of most recent times. For a full seventy-five
years, this provision, the absolute heart of the amendment, was dead for
there was no political power capable of exercising the small authority
left.
The interpretation of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment,
which has been the most litigated portion of the Constitution, is against
the background just outlined. Two thirds of the rest of the amend-
ment of which it was a part had been wiped out by events and inter-
pretation, and this included the key element, the enforcement section.
Moreover, the obliteration of the remainder and the treatment of the
thirteenth and fifteenth amendments had the consequence of eliminat-
ing a political atmosphere which would have any energy devoted to
making something meaningful of section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Hence the result: section 1 of the fourteenth amendment ° rapidly
lost even the faintest resemblance to the original contemplation. It
became a vital part of American constitutional law, but in a fashion
wholly disembodied from its first design.
Specifically:
1. It soon became popular belief that the primary purpose of the
entire amendment was to make Negroes citizens. Generations of high
school students recite the litany that the thirteenth amendment freed
the slaves, the fourteenth made them citizens and the fifteenth gave
them the right to vote. The truth is that the first sentence of the
amendment, which has this effect, was added almost as an afterthought,
after the amendment had already left the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction and had passed the House. The due process clause was al-
10. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
[Vol. 1972:421
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most ignored in the course of adoption.1 This clause, of course, be-
came the most important in the amendment, and much of what the
sponsors of the amendment intended to be covered by the privileges
and immunities clause has been absorbed by interpretation into due
process.
2. Privileges and immunities to be protected from state interference
were intended by the two major sponsors of the section to include at
least the first eight amendments of the Constitution, and perhaps a
good deal more.' 2 The extreme vagueness of this phrase, however,
permitted its quick reduction by interpretation to a virtual nullity.' 3 It
has been of no consequence since. Moreover, this vital clause was to
gain its life through the enforcement provisions of section 5, and the
legal and political emasculation of that provision left privileges and im-
munities a dead fish on the beach.
The failure to give requisite weight to the last section has led to one
of the great debates of recent American constitutional law, a debate in
which both sides are, in this view, on historically irrelevant ground.
Justice Black, in his dissent in Adamson v. California, advanced the
great thesis, "that one of the chief objects [of section 1] was to make
the Bill of Rights applicable to the States."' 4  The historical evidence
makes this view, at least as to privileges and immunities, solidly cor-
rect.
On the other hand, Professor Charles Fairman, in his immense es-
say,' 5 reaches the opposite conclusion. The most solid peg of his argu-
ment is the fact that the "re-founding fathers" of the 1860's could not
have meant anything of the sort because they repeatedly sanctioned
11. No reference to due process was found which gives the term more than a
procedural connotation.
12. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 92
(1947) (app.); H. FLAcx, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTh AamrMNmNr (1965).
Not only did the legislative leaders make the point categorically, but also it had front
page press display. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1866, p. 1, col. 5. Some evidence that this
interpretation was not generally conprehended is offered in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949), discussed
more fully below.
13. The Slaughter-House Cases, 88 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873). Boutwell, a mem-
ber of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, observed in his memoirs: "The part
relating to 'privileges and immunities' came from Mr. Bingham of Ohio. Its euphony
and indefiniteness of meaning were a charm to him." 2 G. BOUTwErL, REmiNIS-
CENCES OF Six= YEARs 41 (1902).
14. 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947).
15. Fairman, supra note 12.
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state constitutions which did not apply all of the Bill of Rights to the
states. Yet Senator Howard, Senate leader for the measure, did say
precisely that the phrase made the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states and Representative Bingham, actual inserter of this language in
section 1, later categorically supported what became the Black position.
As Professor Fairman says, Howard could not have intended to in-
validate his own Michigan state constitutional practice which permitted
prosecution on information rather than grand jury indictment. Pro-
fessor Fairman also says, with accuracy equal to Justice Black's, that
traditional state freedom "repels any thought that the federal provisions
in grand jury, criminal jury, and civil jury were fastened upon them in
1868."16
Each of these great spokesmen is historically correct as far as he
goes, though they appear in utter conflict. Each, with profound re-
spect for both of them, is aside from the historical point. One hundred
years of atomization of the fourteenth amendment into words and
phrases totally obscures its original integration as part of a single, mul-
tifaceted plan for reconstruction.
For historical purposes, privileges and immunities in section 1 can-
not be separated from the enforcement provisions of section 5. It was
contemplated that the two clauses together permitted Congress, as it
might see fit by statutes, to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. Con-
gress was at that moment in the business of adopting civil rights acts of
various types and under various labels. It never occurred to Senator
Howard or Representative Bingham that the privileges and immunities
clause-the Bill of Rights-would become self-enforcing by judicial
decisions. Of course Senator Howard did not contemplate invalidating
the conventionalities of Michigan criminal law; no bill to this (as it
would have seemed to him, absurd) effect was ever contemplated.
Representative Bingham made his expository analysis in 1871 not as an
abstraction, but in the course of a debate on specific civil rights legisla-
tion.1 7
When section 5 dried up and blew away, its elimination created a
power vacuum. That vacuum was later partially filled by judicial ac-
16. id. at 137.
17. Bingham's remarks on the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states were
made in the course of debates before the House on what subsequently became the Act
of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app.
83, col. 3, and 84, cols. 1 and 2 (1871).
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tion which hitched judicial enforcement of parts of the Bill of Rights to
the due process clause. This was fifty years after the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.18
Howard's and Bingham's original conception of the Bill of Rights as
privileges and immunities thus finally slipped into a cloak of constitu-
tional protection in a totally twisted way. The protection was an exer-
cise of judicial power; they thought of legislative authorization. The
language applied was due process; they thought of privileges and im-
munities. The coverage was selective and partial, and came to be an
outright rejection of parts of the Bill of Rights and the substitution of
the "ordered liberty" concept of selectivity; 9 these are all concepts un-
recognizably alien to Howard and Bingham.
Any conception that the due process clause, judicially interpreted
and enforced without supportive legislation, incorporates the Bill of
Rights, has no basis at all in the events of 1866 to 1875. There may
be abundant basis in other historical growth, or in policy, or in philoso-
phy, or in some other source; it may have become a comfortable cus-
tom. However, the correlation to the original intent of the fourteenth
amendment is zero.
3. Partly this is because the due process clause itself was totally
remolded by interpretation. It was almost ignored in the course of its
adoption; no historical reference has been found which gives it more
than a procedural connotation. It became by interpretation the most
important language of the amendment and, as noted, some of what
was contemplated as privileges and immunities was absorbed by inter-
pretation into due process.
4. As Graham has shown, the term "person" was never explicitly
said to include corporations. In view of the very limited meaning
given due process, there was little reason why anyone would have
wanted to include corporations as persons.20 If the sponsors of the
amendment had any notion of including corporations within the pro-
tection of the section, it was probably as "citizens" under the privileges
and immunities clause.2'
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
19. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
20. Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.I.
371 (1938). See also Boudin, Truth & Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 19 (1938).
21. In 1871 Bingham, principal draftsman of section one of the amendment, urged
Vol. 1972:421]
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION
The original understanding of the equal protection clause must be
read against its background.
Before the exploration of that background, warnings must be given.
The generalities of the fourteenth amendment, as reported from Com-
mittee, were voted upon by 218 congressmen, were discussed in hun-
dreds of speeches and countless editorials in the election of 1866, and
were thereafter voted upon by some thousands of state legislators.
Even if the times had been calm and conditions static, the general
phrases of the amendment could not have meant even approximately
the same thing to all who voted upon them; and in fact, interpretations
did diverge widely.
The rapidity with which abolition proceeded makes it particularly
misleading to point to single examples of extant conditions with the as-
surance that the fourteenth amendment meant either to forbid or to
perpetuate them. For example, when the amendment was drafted,
Massachusetts gave completely equal rights to Negroes, including their
acceptance without segregation in the common schools. But Indiana
barred them from the schools altogether, forbade them to make en-
forceable contracts, did not let them testify in court, and excluded Ne-
gro newcomers from the state.22
The fourteenth amendment was a merger of ideals and politics result-
ing from the desire to assure the rewards of victory to the various in-
terests represented by the prevailing political factions in the Civil War
and to maintain those factions in office. The Civil War precipitated a
complete political and economic revolution in both the South and
North which has led historians to call it the Second American Revolu-
tion. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments must be
analyzed in part as the Second American Constitution.
Although the Republican Party, taking the nation as a whole, was
a bill to declare corporations citizens for privileges and immunities purposes. This
accords with the position taken by Webster in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S, (13
Pet.) 519, 549 (1839), discussed in C. SwisHER, RoG R B. TANEY ch. 18 (1935).
For a brief account of the Bingham bill, see McLaughlin, The Court, the Corporation,
and Conkling, 46 AM. HIS. REv. 45, 51 (1940).
22. Indianans were completely aware that equality meant a total change in their
own treatment of Negroes. See, e.g., Speech of Governor 0. P. Morton of Indiana,
Sept. 29, 1865 (Lib. Cong. pamphlet at 13, 14); Report of Supt. of Public Instruction,
IND. Doc. J. 337-39 (1865-66).
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still a minority group at the close of the Civil War, once the South was
made impotent the way was clear for Republican dominance. The
party itself was a coalition of three major groups-the northern manu-
facturers hungering for high tariffs, the farmers of the middle west de-
siring free lands, and the abolitionists.23 As is frequently the case, the
product of this conglomeration contained elements designed to placate
each. Tariffs were raised; free land was made available to the far-
mers; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed to satisfy the aboli-
tionists.24  The fourteenth amendment was also a result of the conver-
gence of these divergent interests in the Republican Party.
Many felt that a variety of problems would be solved by granting
the ballot to Negroes, for it was thought that the concomitant political
power would be sufficient to protect their rights. 25 As a further value,
Stevens saw the ascendancy of the Union Party in the South as a result
of such enfranchisement..2 6  Moreover, if the Negro were to vote Re-
publican, he deserved Republican protection as much as the indus-
trialists and farmersY.2  Thus, Republicans could unanimously support
an equal rights amendment as well as an amendment for equal suf-
frage in the southern states. The climate was not yet ripe for the
North to impose equal suffrage upon itself, for few northern states gave
Negroes the ballot and the Radicals doubted that such an amendment
would be ratified.28
Two different proposals were introduced by the Republicans to attain
their objectives. One of these was Bingham's equal rights amendment
reported out of the Reconstruction Committee in February 1866. This
23. 2 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIvIATION 31 (1935).
24. 2 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
ch. 1 (1942). For an account of the economic situation of the South at the close of
the war, see W. HEssELTrNE, THE SOUTH IN AMERICAN HISTORY 482-89 (1943). For
recognition that a new economic order was dependent upon the Republicans, see Ad-
dress of Representative Boutwell, Reconstruction and Its Relations to the Business of
the Country, Dec. 27, 1866 (Lib. Cong. pamphlet); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 339 (1871) (speech by Representative Kelly).
25. CARL ScHuRz PAPERS 279 (1913); 2 McPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION 1866
at 26.
26. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1867).
27. 1 McPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOx, ELECTION 1866, at 143-44.
28. Cf. Editorial, Baltimore American, Jan. 2, 1866. See House, Northern Con-
gressional Democrats as Defenders of the South During Reconstruction, 6 J. SOUTHERN
Hsr. 46 (1940); Simpson, Political Significance of Slave Representation 1787-1821,
in 7 J. SouTIIE-a HIST. 315 (1941).
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proposal was soon postponed on the floor of the House because of the
adverse sentiment it provoked. 29
On the political problem of suffrage, Blaine introduced an amend-
ment which was successfully carried through the House in February
1866, with the aid of Stevens. 0 The Blaine amendment was ingen-
ious. Instead of imposing Negro suffrage, it merely reduced a state's
representation proportionately to the classes excluded. This would
force the southern states either to enfranchise Negroes or to accept a
sharply reduced representation, but would have little or no effect upon
the northern states with their tiny Negro population. The Blaine
amendment was defeated in the Senate by Sumner with a provocative
two-day speech in which he declared that he would never permit a
provision to enter the Constitution which implied that there might be
less than complete equality.31 Thus, both the equal rights and suffrage
proposals initially met defeat.
The problem was solved by redrafting both proposals and combining
them as sections one and two of the amendment, while adding a third
section to keep prominent Confederates out of office and a fourth sec-
tion to guarantee payment of the northern, but not the southern, war
debt. This combination passed both houses as the fourteenth amend-
ment, and accompanying legislation made its ratification by southern
states a prerequisite to their readmission to Congress.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment as it was thus passed con-
tains the equal protection clause. Before the original meaning of it is
discussed, we shall consider the source of the phrase; what men were
associated with it; and why this particular language came into the
Constitution at all.
"All men are created equal" and "equal protection of the laws" are
phrases which, though closely related, have had distinct histories and
have served very different purposes in the course of slavery and free-
dom.
29. For an account of the consideration of the Bingham amendment at this stage,
see H. Flack, supra note 12, at 56-65 and J. JAmEs, TH FRAMmNo Op THE FoURTEENM
AMENDMENT 91-96 (1956).
30. For an account of the Blaine amendment, see H. Flack, supra note 12, at 97
et seq.
31. The addresses on this topic are included in 10 WoRKs OF CHARFs SUMNM 282,
338 (1874) (hereinafter cited as SUMNER). His central theme was "Equal Rights of
All, at the ballot box as in the court room." Id. at 124.
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Because of the first phrase, the Declaration of Independence became
the rallying cry and the greatest verbal symbol of the abolitionists.
With cheerful disregard of the fact that it had been penned by slave-
holders, the abolitionists pre-empted the "created equal" slogan so suc-
cessfully that their adversaries were finally forced into head-on attack
on the slogan itself and even on the Declaration. 32
Like most great slogans, "created equal" provided no solution for
concrete cases once slavery itself was abolished. For these cases, e.g.,
whether a freedman had a right to ride a streetcar, the abolitionists
needed an instrument more precise than their historic broadside.
The transition from a slogan to a legal tool originated in a contro-
versy over the admission of Negroes to Massachusetts schools. In
1845, the Massachusetts Legislature provided that Negroes should be
educated in public schools. The bill was passed under the vigorous
leadership of Henry Wilson, prominent industrialist and abolitionist
who later became United States Senator and Vice President and who
had led the successful fight for repeal of the Massachusetts law against
miscegenation. In the state senate in 1844 and 1845, he had advo-
cated the admission of Negroes onto railroad cars and had carried the
fight for schools. His argument in the state senate, which constantly
reiterated the theme of equality, was that Negroes should have "the
full and equal benefits of our public schools. 33
Boston responded to the Wilson bill by establishing public but sep-
arate schools for Negro children. The validity of that arrangement
came before the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1849 in Roberts v.
Boston.34 Counsel for Roberts was Charles Sumner, a follower of
Henry Wilson. Sumner's oral argument, 3  distributed through aboli-
tionist ranks as a pamphlet, provided the intellectual material for the
transition of "equality" from aphorism to legal tool.
Sumner contended that separate schools were incompatible with
both the statutes and constitution of Massachusetts. Since no word in
either source specifically dealt with the problem, he was forced to work
from generalizations, and the fundamental generalization which he
chose was the passage in the Massachusetts constitution that "All men
32. See 2 id. at 331 n.2.
33. E. NASON, LIFE OF HENRY WISON 50 (1876).
34. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
35. For a complete reprint of this argument, see 2 SUMNER, supra note 31, at 327.
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are born free and equal." Recognizing the difference between a slo-
gan and a proposition of law, Sumner said:
Of Equality I shall speak, not as a sentiment, but as a principle ...
Thus it is with all moral and political ideas. First appearing as a sen-
timent, they awake a noble impulse, filling the soul with generous
sympathy, and encouraging to congenial effort. Slowly recognized,
they finally pass into a formula, to be acted upon, to be applied, to
be defended in the concerns of life, as principles.3 6
For the purpose of creating the "formula, to be acted upon, to be
applied," Sumner made the first known use in English of the phrase
"equality before the law."'37  He discussed the origins of equality in
sentiment, finding its traces in Herodotus, Seneca, and Milton, 8 and
then took up the transition into formula through the French Revolution
and its predecessor philosophers. Diderot and Rousseau, he explained,
had acclimated the French to the sentiment, and the Revolutionary
Constitution in 1791 took a new step. Its first article declared, "Men
are born and continue free and equal in their rights," thus marking the
first occasion in which equality of rights was made a legal consequence
of "created equal." Sumner traced the rest of the French experience:
the Constitution of February 1793, which had declared "The law ought
to be equal for all"; the Constitution of June 1793, providing "All
men are equal by nature and before the law"; and finally, the memorably
crisp phrase in the Charter of Louis Phillipe, "Frenchmen are equal
before the law."
This principle of equality of rights, Sumner declared, was the real
meaning of the Massachusetts constitutional provision which gave
36. Id. This transition did not finally occur until the fourteenth amendment was
ratified. W. GuTHmi, LEcruREs ON ThE FOuRTEENTh ARTIcLE OF AMENDMENT TO
TIE CONSrrtrIoIN OF TIM UNrran STATES 110 (1898), observed that by it, equality
passed from "a mere theory or sentiment" into "organic law."
37. As will be shown, the phrase was already familiar in French as "galit6 devant
la loi."
38. H. BRANNON, Tm FOURTEENTh A mENrmr 317 (1901), would give Cicero
a prominence in the development of the idea of equality which Sumner disregarded in
this argument. Sumner's primary concentration in developing the origins of equality
on classical and French sources is probably due to his own study in France. Trumbull
referred to Blackstone as a starting point: "[Tihe restraints introduced by the law
should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will admit." CoNo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866), quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIES,
126, 127 (1807 ed.). On equality as an idea in political thought, see Equality, 5
ENcYC. Soc. Sci., 102 (1968).
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equal rights to every human being.3" No distinctions whatsoever could
validly be made because of race, and hence separate schools were ille-
gal.
The Massachusetts court rejected Sumner's argument, but the legis-
lature thereupon overruled the court and explicitly provided that Ne-
groes should be admitted without separation into public schools. 40
The argument, however, outlasted the case. "Equality before the law,"
used interchangeably with "equal rights," was a proposition by which
particular proposals concerning freedmen could be measured.
Sumner, as the foremost theoretician of the abolitionists in high of-
fice, was the center of the move to write his formula into the Constitu-
tion. When the thirteenth amendment was before the Senate in 1864,
its sponsors chose to use the language of the Northwest Ordinance as
the base of their draft.4 ' Sumner expressed no strong objection, since
his first object was extinction of slavery by any formula; but he did sug-
gest as a substitute for purposes of consideration a proposal that, "All
persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another
as a slave."'42 The Sumner phraseology, obviously careful, would write
into the Constitution not merely the extinction of slavery but also the
principle of equal rights, the demand of radicals everywhere. 43
39. "He may be poor, weak, humble, or black,--he may be of Caucasian, Jewish,
Indian, or Ethiopian race,-he may be of French, German, English, or Irish extrac-
tion; but before the Constitution of Massachusetts all these distinctions disappear. He
is not poor, weak, humble, or black; nor is he Caucasian, Jew, Indian, or Ethiopian;
nor is he French, German, English, or Irish; he is a MAN, the equal of all his fellow-
men." 2 SUMNER, supra note 31, at 341-42.
40. MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 256, § 1 (1855).
41. Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance provided: "There shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." Act of July 13, 1787, 1
Stat. 51.
42. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864).
43. Though the Sumner words were not adopted, the central idea of equality was
gererally in men's minds in connection with the thirteenth amendment. Representative
Marcy opposed the thirteenth amendment because his constituents "do not believe
that the black man is equal to the white," (id. at 2950), while Representative Orth
supported it as a practical application of the proposition that "all men are created
equal." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865). Thereafter the idea stayed
at the forefront of discussion. A Pennsylvania State Equal Rights League signed its
correspondence, "Yours for justice and equality before the law." Letter to Stevens of
Nov. 1, 1865, in STEVNs MANUSCRIPTS (Lib. Cong. 1865). One of Sumner's corres-
pondents wrote, "let us dictate no distinction of color or person, all equal before the
law." J. JAMES, supra note 29, at 31, quoting SUMNER'S M2AUSCBuPTS.
Representative Justin Morrill of Vermont scribbled a note to Sumner asking for ad-
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Two proposals were the direct parents of the equal protection clause.
On December 6, 1865, Representative Bingham of Ohio proposed an
amendment authorizing Congress "to secure to all persons in every
State of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and
property."" It is, so far as we know, the first use of the phrase "equal
protection" in a proposed constitutional amendment.Y5
The other proposal originated in the Senate and was the product of
three bills. The first, S. 9, was sponsored by Senator Wilson and in-
validated all laws "whereby or wherein any inequality of civil rights
and immunities" existed because of "distinctions or differences of col-
or, race or descent." '46 By whatever political agreement there may
have been between Senators Trumbull and Wilson, 1 it developed that
vice as to the best way to incorporate this sentiment into law: "Then as to apt
phrase, can you leave all in a jural phrase. Say - all citizens of U.S. resident [in]
said States are equal in their civil rights, immunities & privileges and equally en-
titled to protection in life, liberty and property . . . ." J. JAMES, supra note 29, at
31, quoting SuMmN's MANuscmTs. There is no doubt that Sumner found this form-
ulation adequate. For example, he proposed that southerners take an oath that they
would "discountenance and resist any laws making any distinction of race or color;
and . . . strive to maintain a State government . . . where all men shall enjoy equal
protection and equal rights." 10 SuMNER, supra note 31, at 22.
44. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865).
45. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contained the phrase in a different
context in its Article III: "And every denomination of Christians, demeaning them-
selves peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall be equally under
the protection of the law." And see similarly ME. CoNST. art. I, § 3 (1819); N. H.
CONST. art. VI (1792).
Conceptions similar to equal protection also existed in other early state constitu-
tional provisions. Requirements of a uniform system of taxation in effect require equal
protection in a narrow field. Levy v. Smith, 4 Fla. 154 (1851); State v. Lathrop, 10
La. Ann. 398 (1855); Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 431, 449 (1855);
cf. Smith v. Judge 12th District, 17 Cal. 548, 555 (1861). The common law distinc-
tion between general and special legislation was ancient, Holland's Case, 76 Eng. Rep.
1047 (K.B. 1597); and distinctions in terms of the reasonableness of classifications in
interpretations of provisions of this kind were becoming explicit before 1865. Hingle
v. State, 24 Ind. 28 (1865); Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641 (1859); cf. Madison & Ind. R.R.
v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 240-43 (1856).
The expression "equal protection" had been used by Bingham as early as 1857 in
a fashion indicating that he then made no distinction between it and due process.
CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (app. 1857). On this and other occasions be-
fore the war, Bingham developed extensively a trinitarian theme of "privileges and
immunities," "due process," and "equality," CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 124
(app. 1856); id., 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (app. 1857); id., 35th Cong., 2d Sess.
984-85 (1859). We find the actual phrase "equal protection," however, used only on
the occasion mentioned.
46. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865).
47. Although this is somewhat of a speculation, Trumbull was facing re-election in
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within a few days from the introduction of S. 9, Wilson introduced a
new bill, S. 55, the first section of which was substantially the same
as S. 9, and asked that it be referred to Trumbull's committee .4  S. 55
was never heard of again; but on the first day after the Christmas re-
cess in 1865, Trumbull introduced S. 61, which was a broader bill
containing verbatim the vital language of the earlier bill.49 S. 61
was reported back quickly from Trumbull's committee and speed-
ily became the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
As introduced by Trumbull, S. 61 reduced the somewhat lengthy
language of section 1 of S. 55 (nre S. 9) to a phrase forbidding "dis-
crimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any
State . .. on account of race, color, or previous condition of slav-
ery." Section 2 of S. 55, retained virtually intact by Trumbull in
S. 61, named specific rights to be enjoyed "without distinction of color
or race," and concluded that all inhabitants should have "full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
estate." In this form, S. 61 passed the Senate. As Trumbull said, its
object was "to break down all discrimination between black men and
white men."50 Senator Howard of Michigan, one of the drafters of the
thirteenth amendment and a member of the Joint Committee on Re-
construction which was shortly to prepare the fourteenth amendment,
Illinois early in 1866 and needed the strength which might come from participating
spectacularly in Reconstruction policy. In the campaign, a major issue developed as
to whether Trumbull was really the author of the sentence in the Civil Rights Act of
1866 declaring Negroes to be citizens, but Trumbull made no claim to drafting the rest
of the Act. See McPHERSON'S ScRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 122-32.
48. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 111 (1865). Section two of S. 55,
(Library of Congress printed bills collection) provided:
All inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States, without dis-
tinction of color or race, shall be entitled to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence in all courts and causes, to lease,
purchase, hold, sell, and convey real and personal property, and to have
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and estate.
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 184 (1866). For general historical
surveys of events in Congress during the Thirty-Ninth Congress, see W. BARmES,
THE THITry-Nmrrm CONGRESS (1867) (amounts to extended summary of the Globe);
H. WILSON, HISTORY OF R.ECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, 1865-68 (1868); H. BEALE, THE
CRI CAL YEAR (1930) (conservative viewpoint); 5 J. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES ch. 30 (1906) (radical); 2 J. BLAINE, TwENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS
(1884); 2 F. FESSENDEN, WILLIAM Prr FEssENDEN (1907); A. MILLER, THADDEUS
STEVENS ch. 20 (1939).
50. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866).
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concurred: "In respect to all civil rights, there is to be hereafter no
distinction between the white race and the black race."
51
The House eliminated some of the language in S. 61. Members
disagreed among themselves as to what the phrase "civil rights or im-
munities" might mean, and this vagueness caused it to disappear from
the bill,'; though the "equal benefits" phrase remained. Bingham op-
posed the bill on the floor of the House, being the only Radical to do
so, on the ground that it should await a broader constitutional founda-
tion than the thirteenth amendment. He insisted that there must be a
new amendment which would eliminate all "discrimination between
citizens on account of race or color in civil rights."' 3
Immediately after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction presented the fourteenth amend-
ment. The actual drafting of the first section was done by Bingham.
For the equality clause he had before him two precedent phrases, his
own "equal protection in their rights" and the Wilson-Trumbull civil
rights language, "equal benefits of all laws." It seems clear that he
combined the two phrases and thus arrived at the formula "equal pro-
tection of the laws." More important, he avoided the quandary that he
himself had seen in the Senate draft of the Civil Rights Act, which had
granted equality in vague categories of cases. Bingham dropped the
51. Id. at 504.
52. For various statements of doubt as to meaning, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1117, 1121, 1268-71, 1290-93 (1866) (remarks of Wilson, Rogers, Kerr, Bing-
ham).
53. Id. at 1291, 1293. This thought, as we have elaborated it a little in the sum-
mary in note 62, infra, is criticized as unsupported in Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 H~Av. L. Rnv. 1, 27 n.54 (1955). Prof.
Bickel, referring to our attribution to Bingham of the view that the proposed Civil
Rights Act needed a constitutional basis, says that Bingham does "not express this
opinion attributed to him, nor does he do so anywhere else, and in the light of the
full text of his speech and of his motion, it is doubtful that he held it."
We stand chastened but of the same opinion still. See, e.g., the passage in Bing-
ham's speech referring to the heart of the civil rights bill. He refers to the evils it
sought to correct and said, "I should remedy that not by an arbitrary assumption of
power, but by amending the Constitution of the United States, expressly prohibiting the
States from any such abuse in the future." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291.
Referring to the then pending fourteenth amendment proposals which he was sponsor-
ing, he expressly held them out as the sound way to enforce the Bill of Rights, id.
1292. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15
n.59 (1954) gives the Bingham position the same reading as do we, saying of Bingham's
opposition, "... Bingham insisted another amendment to be both necessary and desir-
able."
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limitations, making the equality coextensive with the broad claims of
Negro rights espoused by his fellow dominant members of the Recon-
struction Committee, Stevens and Howard.54
When the fourteenth amendment reached the floor, and indeed when
it was before the country, only general attention was given to the first
section, and particularly the equal protection clause. Primary atten-
tion of all was on the political sections."
The principal statements made on the floor of Congress concerning
the first section were to the effect that it put the Civil Rights Act of
1866 beyond the reach of repeal. 56 Randall, as a leading Democrat
in opposition, protested that "equality in every respect between the
two races" should not be ordered by Congress. 7  The typical House
statement on equal protection was so general as to have no particular
meaning.58 Senator Howe, a prominent Republican, listed as elements
of equal protection the right to hold land which has been purchased,
the right to collect wages, and the right to appear in court and give
testimony; but he stressed that "these are not the only rights," and
added, as an example of a denial of equal rights, Florida's discrimi-
nation between the races in educational systems.5 9 Senator Howard,
floor leader for the amendment in the Senate, summarized the meaning
of the clause thus: "[It] abolishes all class legislation in the States and
does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a
code not applicable to another." Howard finally reduced the clause
to the familiar phrase: "It establishes equality before the law ....
54. The Stevens proposal had been that all laws should be "equally applicable to
every citizen, and no discrimniation shall be made on account of race and color."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865). The Howard view was that "in respect
to all civil rights ...there is to be hereafter no distinctions between the white race
and the black race." Id. at 504.
55. Republicans were jubilant over the fact that the South would lose twenty-five
of its seventy-five representatives unless it admitted Negroes to suffrage, and that
Confederate leaders would be disqualified from office. Only ten of several hundred
newspaper clippings related to section one of the amendment. MCPHERSON'S SCRAP-
BOOK, THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT.
56. See, e.g., opening statement of Stevens in support of the amendment, CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).
57. Id. at 2530.
58. E.g., the observations of Representative Farnsworth, which consist largely of
elaborate repetition of the phrase. Id. at 2539.
59. Id. at 217, 219 (app.).
60. Id. at 2766. After passage by Congress, the amendment went to the state
legislatures for ratification. What few fragments there are relevant to the interpre-
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We conclude that the fundamental working legal theory of equality
before the law, or equal rights, or equal protection, based on well-
established tradition, was formulated for American law by Sumner,
and popularized under his leadership. 61 The actual language of equal
protection found its way into the Constitution from the Sumner draft
of the thirteenth amendment, to the Wilson draft of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, through Trumbull as public sponsor of the Civil Rights
Act and certainly through Bingham.
To this group of the four "insiders" must be added the eleven ma-
jority members other than Bingham of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, from which the amendment actually emerged. The total
number of "insiders" is thus fifteen, and a central inquiry is the deter-
mination of the meaning of equal protection to them.
This group had a unified meaning as to the nature of the equal right
to testify, to sue and to hold property. Their stand on other specific
questions is outlined in sections following. On the broader question
of whether equal protection would, under any circumstances, permit
laws making distinctions based on race or color, there is less uniform-
ity and less precise evidence. We conclude that of the fifteen, eight,
Sumner, Wilson, Bingham, Howard, Stevens, Conkling, Boutwell and
tation of equal protection have not been very helpful. Typical is the fairly meaning-
less comment of Governor F. F. Low of California in recommending ratification to
his state legislature: "This section declares 'equality before the law' for all citizens,
in the solemn and binding form of a constitutional enactment, to which no reasonable
objections can be urged." CALIF. SEN. J. 49 (1867-68). Governor Curtin of Penn-
sylvania, in his message recommending ratification, thought the meaning of section
one too obvious for serious comment. 1 PA. ExEc. Docs. (Jan. 2, 1867).
61. Sumner's strenuous opposition to the amendment went to the representation
provisions; see his immense speech, "The Equal Rights of All," discussed in D. DON-
ALD, CHlARLuS SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 243-47 (1970).
Harris alludes to the long background when he says, "[Tlhe idea of the positive
duty of government to afford positive protection of civil rights to the individual person
by equal laws was a common part of the American political tradition and its vocabu-
lary long before the rise of the Abolitionists and, of course, long before Bingham and
his fellow Radicals saw to its inclusion in the fourteenth amendment." R. HARIS,
Trm QUEST FOR EQUALITY 22 (1960).
Graham puts it well: "What was taking place was one of the most subtle and
evanescent of all the possible changes in law and government, a transubstantiation
of values from the ethical to the civil and constitutional plane. It was a delicate, un-
even and above all a continuing change-a 'constitutionalization' of the old law of na-
ture." Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8
(1954). See also Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. REV.
1049, 1052 (1956).
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Morrill, probably accepted an interpretation of equal protection which
precluded any use whatsoever of color as a basis of legal distinctions. 2
Trumbull, Fessenden and Grimes on some occasions countenanced
some types of segregation, at least as to miscegenation. 3  The posi-
tions of Harris, Williams, Blow and Washburne are unascertained.64
III. INTERPRETATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
DURING RECONSTRUCTION
The Slaughter-House Cases in 1873 gave this interpretation to the
equal protection clause: "We doubt very much whether any action of
a State not directed by way of discrimination against the Negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the
purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and
that emergency [the black codes], that a strong case would be nec-
essary for its application to any other."0 5  This was narrow construc-
tion with a vengeance, and Justice Miller, its author, quickly re-
62. Nothing need be added to the text references as to Sumner, Wilson, Howard,
and Stevens. Conkling's position is established by his regular support of the Sumner
Civil Rights Bill of 1875, discussed at length infra, as is Morrill's and Boutwell's;
and in addition Boutwell, as a typical Massachusetts abolitionist, held the view that he
would positively require intermingling of the races to break down prejudices. CoNG.
GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 4116 (1874). Morrill consistently opposed any distinctions
based on color. Id. at 2240. The case as to Bingham is less clear, because his pre-
occupation with his own amendment was largely with the privileges and immunities
clause. We know that he thought appropriate language should eliminate "all discrimina-
tion between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights." CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866). Since Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act
solely because he thought it should await passage of the fourteenth amendment, we as-
sume that he thought the amendment would at least cover that wide area of state dis-
criminatory legislaton; see note 53 supra.
63. These three Senators shortly split off from the radical wing of the Republican
Party, being among the seven Republicans who supported Johnson on impeachment.
Both Fessenden and Trumbull believed that the Civil Rights Act and the amendment
did not affect anti-miscegenation legislation. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322,
505 (1866). Grimes saw no inequality in segregated transportation, CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3133 (1864), although Trumbull seems to have had the opposite
point of view on this question. Id. at 3132. W. SALTER, LIFE OF J. W. GRIMES
276-322 (1876), covers the years 1865-67 in Grimes' life and reveals no substantial
interest in either the amendment or reconstruction.
64. All four were routine Radicals. Harris and Williams each served only one term
in the Senate, and Blow served two terms in the House. Harris, Blow, and Wash-
burne came to Congress with strong anti-slavery backgrounds. We have found no
statements by any of the four which would give an indication of the breadth of equal
protection to them.
65. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
443
Washington University Open Scholarship
444 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
canted. 66 It was obvious from the discussion of the amendment, its
background, and its contemporary interpretation, that the clause
reached all racial classifications, including groups other than Negroes.07
Miller's observation, however, certainly did not conflict with con-
temporary understanding as to economic regulatory action unrelated to
racial distinctions. Although there is little doubt that Republicans
would have approved of restraints upon regulation of business had they
thought of it, we have not found anywhere even a single intimation
that this possibility did in fact occur to them.08 In other words, there
was no contemporary -understanding of the relation of equal protection
to business regulation.
A. Equality in the Courts and Commerce
Under the pre-rebellion black codes, the free Negro's position dif-
fered little from that of the slave, except that a freedman had the right
to the fruits of his own labor, usually the right to hold personal prop-
erty, and in a few states the right to hold real property." Also, he
ranked a step above the slave in the law courts. The slave, of course,
could not sue in the courts, since any rights of action arising out of
transactions in which he was involved were the property of his mas-
ter.70 The free Negro could own rights of action, but like a minor,
could frequently enforce them only by a suit through a guardian or
next friend, a white man; and he could be a witness only in actions
where only Negroes were involved. 71
In criminal law, the status of the free Negro was about on a par
with that of the slave. Frequently statutes imposing liability on one
66. C. FAmMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 186, 187 (1939).
67. Cf. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (No. 6546) (C.C. Cal. 1879)
(equal protection extended to Chinese); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
68. There is, however, clear evidence that Congressmen were aware that the lan-
guage was broader than the immediate evil faced. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1063-64, 2766 (1866) (statements of Howard and Stevens).
69. See, e.g., COBB's NEw DIG. LAWS GA. 993, 995 (1851) [hereinafter cited as
COBB].
70. LA. Crv CODE, arts. 174, 175, 177 (1838). One of the rare exceptions to
this proposition is Sally's Guardian v. Beaty, 1 Bay 260 (S.C. 1792), in which a slave
was held to have the right to purchase and emancipate another slave. The leading col-
lection of materials on legal aspects of the slavery system is 4 H. CATTERALL, JUDI-
CIAL CASES CoNCERNING AManucAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (1926).
71. COBB, supra note 69, at 973, 985, 988, 999; Miss. Rav. CODE, ch. 33, art. 62
(1857).
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imposed it on the other as well. Arson, burglary, mayhem (against
a white person), rape or attempted rape (against a white person)
were typical capital crimes both for slave and for free Negro.72
Preaching the gospel, using insulting language to white persons, as-
sembling together to learn to read and write: these were typical mis-
demeanors for the Negro, slave or free.73  Except in capital cases, the
Negro, slave or free, was tried by a jury of slaveholders, who could
convict by a majority vote.74
The black codes after the war perpetuated or created many dis-
criminations in the crimini law by applying unequal penalties to Ne-
groes for recognized offenses and by specifying offenses for Negroes
only."' Laws which prohibited Negroes from keeping weapons or
from selling liquor were typical of the latter. Examples of discrimina-
tory penalties were the laws which made it a capital offense for a Ne-
gro to rape a white woman, or to assault a white woman with intent to
rape, or the ingenious bit of foresight by which the South Carolina
Legislature made it a felony without benefit of clergy "for a person of
color to have sexual intercourse with a white woman by impersonating
her husband. '70
In addition to the discriminations of the criminal laws, post-war
black codes hedged in the Negroes with a series of restraints on their
business dealings of even the simplest form. Though in many states
the Negro could acquire property, Mississippi put sharp limitations on
that right.7 7  But most restrictive were the provisions concerning con-
tracts for personal service. Many statutes called for specific enforce-
ment of labor contracts against freedmen, with provisions to facilitate
72. LA. BLACK CODE, CIM. OFFENSES § 7 (1806); COBB, supra note 69, at 987.
73. Miss. REv. CODE, ch. 33, art. 84 (1857); LA. BLACK CODE § 40 (1806);
COBB, supra note 69, at 1001, 1005.
74. COBB, supra note 69, at 986; Miss. Rav. CODE, ch. 33, art. 68 (1857).
75. For a collection of the black codes, see E. McPHERsoN, HANDBOOK OF Poal-
TICS FOR 1868, at 29-44 (1868); 1 W. FLEMNG, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RE-
CONSTRUC7ION ch. 4 (1906). These codes were never in effect for a substantial
length of time. E. MCPHERSON, supra, at 36-38.
For the most valuable contemporary description of the South in the immediate post-
Appomattox period, see 2 SEN. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) (report by
Major General Carl Schurz). Although it is frankly partisan in its radical viewpoint,
it is nevertheless important to an understanding of the fourteenth amendment, for it
is what the Radicals believed and acted upon.
76. 13 S.C. STAT. 277 (1865).
77. Miss. LAws 82 (Reg. Sess. 1865).
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capture should a freedman try to escape. Vagrancy laws made it a
misdemeanor for a Negro to be without a long-term contract of em-
ployment; conviction was followed by a fine, payable by a white man
who could then set the criminal to work for him until the benefactor
had been completely reimbursed for his generosity. Minors were re-
membered in compulsory apprenticeship laws which arranged for long-
term instruction in the arts of hoeing and cotton-picking. Not infre-
quently there were provisions that the former owner should have first
call upon the labor of an ex-slave.78
Congress of necessity had given considerable thought to the prob-
lems facing the southern states. As arbiter of procedure for federal
courts and as legislator for the District of Columbia, Congress had
faced essentially the same problems in converting from a slave system
to a free one. In 1862 congressional action applicable to the District
abolished slavery, 79 repealed the black codes,80 and prohibited exclu-
sion of witnesses on account of color.81  On July 2, 1864, there was
passed Senator Sumner's amendment to the Civil Appropriation Bill
which provided that witnesses could no longer be excluded on account
of color in the federal courts.82
Congress began the uprooting of these codes outside the District of
Columbia with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It provided:
[C]itizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.88
As can be seen, that Act dealt explicitly with the inequalities of the
black codes in criminal and commercial law, and its principles passed
into the equal protection clause. Indeed, Stevens occasionally defined
Negro equality in terms of these obvious discriminations: "the same
78. ALA. Aers 120 (1865-66); 13 S.C. STAT. 302 (1865) (employees forbidden
to leave master's premises without permission).
79. 12 Stat. 376 (1862).
80. 12 Stat. 407 (1862).
81. 12 Stat. 539 (1862).
82. 13 Stat. 351 (1864).
83. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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law which punishes one man shall punish any other for the same
offense; . . . the law which gives a verdict to one man shall render
the same verdict to another, whether he is Dutch, Irish, or Negro."
84
He assured Congress when he presented the fourteenth amendment
that Negroes would be subject to equal punishments, and would re-
ceive equal "means of redress" and equal right to testify. 5 The Act
and the amendment obliterated the commercial discriminations by giv-
ing Negroes equal rights to contract and to be subject to no vagrancy
laws which did not apply to whites.
Considerable doubt exists as to whether the equal protection clause
was meant to confer equality in jury service. The Civil Rights Act of
1866, which was quite explicit in its language, said nothing of jury
service; "equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property" was the only language under which jury service
could conceivably come. Representative Wilson, floor leader for the
Bill, stated in debate that the Act would not affect jury service. 6 Dur-
ing the passage of the fourteenth amendment itself, no discussion of
this point was had. Congress first acted to admit Negroes to juries in
the District of Columbia in 1867, s7 labeling its bill an "equal rights"
measure, although it had enacted five years earlier a provision requir-
ing colored persons there to be subject to the same laws as free
whites.88 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 contained the first explicit
provision for nondiscrimination by states in jury service, indicating a
subsequent judgment by the authors of the amendment that jury ser-
vice was included."' The Supreme Court promptly upheld the Act as
84. Address by Senator Stevens at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Sept. 27, 1866, in 1
MCPHERSON'S SCAPBOOK, CAMPAIGN OF 1866, at 48.
85. This subject was exhaustively considered in S. REP. No. 25, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1864) (Committee on Slavery and Freedmen).
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Representative Wilson
should not be confused with Senator Wilson. See also the editorial to the effect
that jury duty is not a civil right. MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF
1866, at 41.
87. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 727 (1867). The measure was pocket
vetoed and then repassed in the next session as a measure "for the further security of
equal rights." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 96 (1867). Again pocket
vetoed, it finally was passed in Grant's administration. 16 Stat. 3 (1869).
88. 12 Stat. 407 (1862).
89. 18 Stat. 336 (1875). Repealed, Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, § 21, 62 Stat.
862. Senator Carpenter ably opposed this provision, contending that jury service was
a political, and not a civil, right; but he was overridden by his colleagues. See note
163 infra.
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within the equal protection clause." It seems fair to conclude that,
while Congress did not have jury service in mind in 1866 as a civil
right, the language of the amendment was broad enough to cover jury
service in the apparent absence of any intent to the contrary.
Cases speedily came to lower courts testing the meaning of the Act,
and it was interpreted as expected. A Delaware court held that Ne-
groes could not testify regardless of the Act,9 but Justice Swayne in a
federal circuit court held to the contrary.92 George Ruby, a freedman
beaten up by a New Orleans mob for teaching school, made history in
Louisiana by being allowed to testify in the resultant assault case.9 3
The attorney general of Tennessee declared that he would resist the
Civil Rights Act by keeping Negroes out of the tippling house and
billiard trade; but the Memphis criminal court speedily overruled him
with the pronouncement that "Negroes of Memphis may now open as
many billiard saloons as they want."94
In its criminal law aspect, the clause was the broadest possible gen-
eralization. To some it was the American equivalent of the pledge of
Magna Carta: "We will sell to no man, we will deny to no man, we
will delay to no man right or justice."93
B. Segregation
For the most part, the rights discussed above raise no possibility of
reconciling equality with separation of Negroes from whites. The right
to testify, for example, could not rationally be made a right to testify
only in the presence of Negroes. On the other hand, a right to equal
transportation could, at least without being as irrational, be a right to
separate transportation.
90. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). Justice Field, dissenting, es-
poused the Carpenter position that jury service was a political right. Id. at 367, 368.
Professor Bickel is less reserved on this question. He asserts that the equal pro-
tection clause, ". . as originally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury
service, nor suffrage, nor anti-miscegenation statutes, nor segregation." Bickel, Origi-
nal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 58 (1955).
91. MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTs BILL OF 1866, at 149.
92. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151) (C.C. Ky. 1866).
93. MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, Civm RIGHTS BILL OF 1866, at 115, 116.
94. Id. at 109, 119.
95. "Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justifiam." The
clause was given this florid interpretation by Bingham and Edmunds. CONG. GLOBE,
42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 697 (1871); id. at 81, 83 (app.).
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Segregation, with its legal corollary of "separate but equal," is a term
which our generation has applied loosely as a unitary concept to cover
the entire area in which separation of the races is feasible. This con-
cept has been applied to such disparate situations as separation in
transportation, schools, drinking fountains, housing, churches, hotels,
restaurants, theaters, health services, employment opportunities, and
cemeteries.98
Difficulty exists in discovering the original meaning of equal protec-
tion as it relates to this problem because it never occurred to a substan-
tial number of persons in the decade under study to approach this
question in any such unitary way. Three distinct views can be identi-
fied. The abolitionist view of equality, represented by Sumner, per-
mitted absolutely no distinctions of any kind based on color. Directly
opposite was the view of the opponents of the Civil Rights Act and the
fourteenth amendment with their rough slogan of "no nigger equal-
ity."' a7 Both of these groups may fairly be described as having a uni-
tary concept of segregation. The abolitionists were against it in every
context, though on this point no direct discussion among them has
been found for the critical year of 1866. Some conservatives approved
of segregation in all respects, 98 professing to believe that equal protec-
tion obliterated every restraint on intermingling.9 This interpretation
of equal protection probably was taken by them only as conventional
opposition party Cassandras, for after the amendment was adopted
96. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA ch. 28 (1944).
97. Senator Saulsbury of Delaware consistently represented this view. CoNG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1141, 1364 (1864). Contrast the resolution of the
Republican state convention at Syracuse, New York, in 1866, declaring that the four-
teenth amendment terminated the old maxim "This is a white man's government,"
I AICPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 3, with the opposition slogans:
Placard of the Seventh Ward Johnson Club in New York City at a Union Square rally,
"No Negro equality," id. at 79; Address of General Spinola at a Johnson meeting in
New York, "Every man who ... rejects the Negro as his equal ... will sustain
the President," id. at 61; or the editorial of the St. Louis Republican supporting the
Johnson veto of the Civil Rights Act, "The President put his foot down on nigger equal-
ity." MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, CwVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1866, at 54.
98. For example, Senator Hendricks of Indiana, a conservative, said that giving
Negroes the right to testify, to be jurors, or to be in the same streetcars with white
persons was all of one erroneous piece: "These all stand upon the proposition that
the negro is the equal of the white man." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 839
(1864).
99. See, e.g., remarks of Senators Cowan and Johnson, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 500, 505 (1866).
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the conservatives frequently gave a very narrow construction of the
terms they had once thought so broad.
Between these two extreme positions was a middle group which, in
the years 1865-68 in particular, never had to take a stand on the
problems as a whole because its outlines were not clearly perceived.
Segregation, as compared, for instance, with twenty days' hard labor
for preaching the gospel, is a fairly refined development in the
history of discrimination. In the South, with slavery just abolished,
discrimination against the Negro which angered Congress was of a
much cruder kind.
It is not surprising that Congress, concerned with securing to the
freedman the most fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property,
should not have devoted much time in its first post-war sessions to
considering where he should sit in theaters and trains. Because the
problem of segregation was never squarely faced during the incubation
period of the amendment, the task of interpreting mass opinion on
equal protection with absolute assurance becomes impossible. This
difficulty is heightened by acceptance in the middle group of a formula
which evades precise analysis. Under that middle approach, there
were three types of equality with corresponding rights: political equal-
ity, civil equality, and social equality. The equal protection clause was
clearly not intended to include the right to vote.100 Putting the ques-
tion of political equality aside, this group made a hazy division between
the other two terms, believing that equal protection granted "civil
equality" but not "social equality." A typical example of a use of this
conception by a supporter of the amendment is Greeley's observation:
"You can't make all men equal socially. One is stronger, better, brav-
100. The history of the amendment proves conclusively that the Radicals were un-
able to deal with the suffrage problem at that time except by the circumlocutions of
section two of the amendment. The whole reason for Radical opposition to the amend-
ment was its failure to give complete and equal suffrage. The majority of the Massa-
chusetts House Committee recommended against the amendment because it permitted
disfranchisement of Negroes, while the minority favored ratification but asked for an
additional amendment on universal suffrage. MAss. LEG. Doc., H. R. REP. No. 149,
4, 15 (1867). It follows that Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), invalidating
a Texas statute barring Negroes from voting on the ground that the statute denied
equal protection, was not in accord with the original understanding of equal protection;
but the subsequent decision in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), returned to the
original plan of the war amendments by invalidating a similar Texas statute under the
fifteenth amendment rather than the fourteenth. For further consideration of the
voting problems, see notes 190-91 infra and accompanying text.
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er than the other. Now what I want is that all men should be equal
before the law. I want the black man to have his rights all over the
South. The law should know nothing about a man's color."''1 1
One central theme emerges from the talk of "social equality": there
are two kinds of relations of men, those that are controlled by the
law and those that are controlled by purely personal choice. The for-
mer involves civil rights, the latter social rights. There are statements
by proponents of the amendment from which a different definition
could be taken, but this seems to be the usual one. Frequently, of
course, the terms were used with no content at all, as when a Pennsyl-
vania Republican simply told his audience that the amendment granted
civil rights but not social rights; 102 but when analysis began, the ex-
planation given above usually appeared.
Thus, in one debate Senator Harlan of Iowa explained that the right
of Negroes to use the streetcars did not involve social equality since the
right was legal in origin. 1 3  Normally the hotelkeeper's responsibility
not to discriminate was explained in terms of a distinction between
taking a Negro into the hotel or dining room, as distinguished from
putting him into a particular room or at a particular table: the hotel-
keeper's obligation to take customers rested on law, but the right to
choose one's own tablemate was "social.' 011 4  Stevens himself stressed
the vital distinction between matters of law and matters of taste: "This
doctrine does not mean that a Negro shall sit on the same seat or eat at
the same table with a white man. That is a matter of taste which
every man must decide for himself. The law has nothing to do with
it.,,luS
Thus the original distinction appears to have been that the law
should know no distinctions of color, but that personal taste should be
left to govern itself. In this, the practical difference between the aboli-
tionist and the middle position was that the abolitionists as a moral
matter encouraged complete intermingling even though this entered
the zone of taste, while the middle group lacked any such fervor.
Because the civil-social distinction was misty, it is easiest to diagnose
original opinion by studying its application to concrete cases.
101. 1 MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 117-18.
102. 2 MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 37.
103. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 839 (1864).
104. See, e.g., 2 CoNG. REc. 4082 (1874) (remarks of Senator Pratt of Indiana).
105. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1867).
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1. Geographical segregation. Restrictions of Negroes to particular
regions of the country or to particular areas in a city by limiting their
right to buy and live on particular pieces of property is the most ob-
vious kind of segregation to have been forbidden by equal protection.
As has already been noted, Illinois and Indiana excluded all Negroimmigration into the state prior to the Civil War; and the southern
states by old and new codes for freedmen excluded them from particu-
lar areas and from buying real estate.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided that "citizens, of
every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State
. . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property . . . . ,10 President Johnson, in his veto message, specifical-
ly challenged the right of Congress to "abrogate all State laws of dis-
crimination between the two races in the matter of real estate."10 7
The veto was overridden, and it was proclaimed by every advocate of
the fourteenth amendment that it carried the principles of the Act into
the Constitution.
There are many points of doubt in the determination of the original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment, but on this one we think
there is no room for serious difference of opinion. In view of the
specific grant in the Civil Rights Act of "the same right" to hold and
use property, no distinctions whatsoever based on race or color could
be made in respect to this right. Geographic segregation was com-
pletely forbidden.
2. Segregation in transportation. The type of segregation most
frequently considered between 1865 and 1875 was segregation in
transportation. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1866, attention focused
largely on transportation in Washington. Thereafter, the issue was
widespread as Negroes sought to utilize the privileges they thought
the Act had given them. The central legal theory of the attack on
segregated transportation was that transportation companies had a
common law duty to take all comers and that making any distinctions
in the operation of this duty because of color denied an equal right to
contract for transportation. The vital distinctions are highlighted by
Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, perhaps the ablest constitu-
tionalist of the conservative faction:
106. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
107. 6 J. R cHARDsoN, A CO11PILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 405, 407 (1897).
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It may be convenient, because it meets with the public wish or with
the public taste of both classes, the white and the black, that there
should be cars in which the white men and ladies are to travel, desig-
nated for that purpose, and cars in which the black men and black
women are to travel, designated for that purpose. But that is a matter
to be decided as between these two classes. There is no more right to
exclude a black man from a car designated for the transportation of
white persons than there is a right to refuse to transport in a car desig-
nated for black persons white men. 108
The matter was repeatedly before Congress. The Senate voted
against segregated transportation in one form or another at least six
times from 1863 to 1875. In 1863, Congress amended the charter of
the Alexandria and Washington Railroad and provided that "No per-
son shall be excluded from the cars on account of color."'0 9  A year
later the Washington and Georgetown Railroad, a street railway in the
District of Columbia, excluded a Negro army officer from a car. The
District Committee, after an investigation in response to a request by
Sumner, reported that no legislation was necessary; the officer could
sue because "colored persons are entitled to all the privileges of said
road which any other persons have."" 0 The company attempted to
propitiate this sentiment by putting on more cars for the exclusive use
of Negroes, a concession which gave Sumner no comfort because
"whenever they exclude a colored person from any one of their cars
they do it in violation of law.""'
Sumner thereupon embarked upon a crusade to eliminate streetcar
segregation in the District. He successfully carried an amendment to
the charter of the Depot and Ferry Co. Railway by a vote of 24 to 6,
that "no person shall be excluded from any car on account of color."'
1 2
He lost, 14 to 16, an effort to put a similar provision into the Washing-
ton and Georgetown Railway charter because some Radicals thought it
unnecessary in view of the clarity of the law; but finally he achieved
complete victory in 1864 and 1865 when he carried an amendment to
the Metropolitan Railway Company's charter by which the prohibition
against exclusions from any car because of color was "extended to
every other railroad in the District of Columbia.""'
108. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156 (1864).
109. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 110, § 1, 12 Stat. 805.
110. SEN. REP. No. 17, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1864).
111. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 817 (1864).
112. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (1865).
113. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3131-35 (1864).
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All this debate upon the whole issue of segregation in transportation
took place before the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. Those
who opposed the measures contended that segregation was perfectly
valid. Senator Saulsbury of Delaware, for example, said such legisla-
tion would be "a war against nature and nature's God."' 14  More re-
strained Senators, such as Grimes and Doolittle, argued merely that
there was no harm in separation.115 Those who supported the legis-
lation did so on grounds of equality. Senator Wilson denounced the
"Jim Crow car"-to make Negroes stand on a front platform, he said,
was "in defiance of decency."" 6  Sumner observed of Massachusetts
that there "the rights of every colored person are placed on an equality
with those of white persons. They have the same right with white
persons to ride in every public conveyance in the commonwealth. '1
He asked the same rule of equality for the District.
The first of the Sumner amendments came before the Supreme
Court in Railroad Co. v. Brown,"" a case which is an important part
of this history. On February 8, 1868, Catharine Brown, colored,
bought a ticket on the Alexandria and Washington Railway. That
company, its charter containing the amendment providing that "no
person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color," main-
tained two identical and connected cars, using one for colored and the
other for white passengers. When Mrs. Brown attempted to sit in the
"white" car, she was ejected with great violence.
The episode attracted immediate attention because Mrs. Brown was
in charge of the ladies' rest room at the Senate. An immediate Senate
investigation was undertaken to explore whether the company's char-
ter should be repealed. One hearing was held in the shanty in which
Mrs. Brown lived and was recuperating. The Committee concluded
that the company had violated its charter. It recommended against
repeal of the charter because it thought compensation by judicial pro-
ceedings would be adequate, but it concluded: "If the result of the
legal proceedings which Mrs. Brown has instituted should not be satis-
factory, or if the conduct of the said Company in the future shall not
114. Id. at 1141.
115. Id. at 1159, 3133.
116. Id. at 3132.
117. Id. at 1158.
118. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
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be satisfactory, the resolution can be taken from the table, and the
charter of the Company repealed."' 19
The company, contending that segregation was "reasonable and le-
gal," asked for a charge to the jury that it was under no obligation to
plaintiff to do more than offer separate but equal cars. The trial court
rejected the charge, and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, re-
jecting the "separate but equal" argument as "an ingenious attempt to
evade a compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement."12
The Court declared that the object of Congress was not merely to af-
ford transportation for Negroes, which anyone selling transportation
would of course want to give them if they had the money to buy it.
Rather:
It was the discrimination in the use of the cars on account of
color, where slavery obtained, which was the subject of discussion at
the time, and not the fact that the colored race could not ride in the cars
at all. Congress, in the belief that this discrimination was unjust, acted.
It told this company, in substance, that it could extend its road into the
District as desired, but that this discrimination must cease, and the
colored and white race, in the use of the cars, be placed on an equality.
This condition it had the right to impose, and in the temper of Congress
at the time, it is manifest the grant could not have been made withoutit.121
Clearly "in the temper of the Congress at the time," segregation in
transportation was "discrimination," not "equality." We believe that
the equal protection clause, in the eyes of its contemporaries, froze into
constitutional law the existing common law obligation of transportation
companies to take all comers and to eliminate any possibility of their
segregation. Congress decided so often in this period that color clas-
sifications were not permissible for purposes of transportation that it is
difficult to understand how equal protection could possibly be given
another meaning. In 1872, under the leadership of Carpenter, the
Senate passed a bill forbidding the making of any distinctions because
of color by railroads, inns, and theaters; the conservative opposition
confined its attack-unsuccessfully-to the inns and theaters sections,
119. SEN. REP. No. 131, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1868).
120. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445, 452 (1873). See also Brief
for Plaintiff, found in the United States Supreme Court Library.
121. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445, 452-53 (1873) (emphasis
added).
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apparently conceding the point as to transportation.1 22  By the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, Congress made a final attempt to obliterate com-
pletely segregation in transportation. 123
3. Segregation in hotels and theaters. The hotel and theater prob-
lem was considered much the same as the transportation problem. As
to all of these facilities, the Radicals believed that there was a common
law right to admittance which had obtained constitutional status.
There was this difference in some minds: the common law right of
transportation was wholly "civil" while the right to a hotel was par-
tially "social." It was felt that the innkeeper must accept a Negro
applicant, give him a room and access to the dining room, and in no
way treat him as an inferior guest. On the other hand, the white per-
son renting a room or taking a table had his own right to decide whom
he would have as his guest in what had become, for the moment, his
own room and his own table; and the Radicals conceded that such a
guest could exercise dominion as he chose in the selection of his own
guests and companions.' 4
There was an even more substantial difference as to theaters.
Though highly regulated, theaters were not subject to a common law
right of general use, as were trains or hotels. We find no thinking
directed squarely at the consequences of this fact, but the inclusion of
theaters in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 seems to have been based on
a theory that since theaters were extensively regulated they were crea-
tures of the law, and therefore subject to the requirements of equality.125
4. Segregation in education. To understand the relation of equal
protection to education, it is necessary to recall two crusades, abolition-
ism and the public school movement, both of which began major ag-
122. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3730, 3734-36 (1872). After a proposed
amendment by Thurman was defeated, the measure passed the Senate but was unsatis-
factory to the extreme radicals because it did not go far enough. Id. at 3737-40.
Its provisions were eventually included in the broader Sumner Civil Rights Bill.
123. This Act forbade interference with "the full and equal enjoyment" of any
"public conveyances on land or water." Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18
Stat. 335.
124. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
125. Sumner's legal theory was expressed thus: "Show me, therefore, a legal insti-
tution, anything created or regulated by law, and I show you what must be opened
equally to all without distinction of color." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242
(1871). Inclusion of theaters may reflect a Puritan attitude that theaters exist wholly
by legal suffrance. Cf. 1 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, Risa OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
465-66 (rev. ed. 1935).
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gressive development in the 1830's. The rapid spread of abolitionism
from a few print shops and meeting places occurred because the whole
society was ripe for a wave of good works, such as land reforms, suf-
frage, temperance agitation, women's rights, and many other ameliora-
tive movements. As abolition was a crusade, so was the movement
for public schools, which was spread throughout the North in the years
between 1830 and the Civil War. Frequently the abolitionists and the
public school men were the same people. There was no limit to the
social good which was expected of the schools by their sponsors. Said
Thaddeus Stevens, as Pennsylvania leader of the free school move-
ment: "What earthly glory is there equal in luster and duration to that
conferred by education?"'126
The public school system made much less headway in the South.
The children of the well-to-do went to private academies, while others
usually had little or no schooling at all. By the census of 1850, illiter-
acy among native whites was twenty percent in the South, three per-
cent in the Midwest, and less than one percent in New England. 27
In New England particularly, education was the vehicle for the in-
doctrination of Puritan morality, and nowhere was its use as an aux-
iliary to other crusades more fully appreciated. Hence in the wake of
the northern troops came the schoolteachers of the Freedmen's Aid So-
cieties, ready to make abolition a success by educating the South.128
A substantial part of post-war education in 1865 and 1866 was in the
hands of these societies; the task of teachers included a mingling of
education and propaganda for children and adults.'29
To these societies with a blind confidence in the capacity of educa-
tion to solve all of the nation's social ills, nothing was impossible; and
126. J. WOODBURN, THE LIFE OF THADDEUS STEVENS 49 (1913).
127. C. EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH c. 3 (1940).
128. "We must plant a 'Yankee school' in every Southern county, if we expect the
rising generation of the recent slave States to march arm in arm with Massachusetts in
the future." FREEDMEN'S RECORD 159 (1866). The most vivid record of the work of
northern educational agencies is in their publications, particularly the American
Freedman and the Freedmen's Journal. Their work was very substantial, the Ameri-
can Freedman's and Union Commission operating 307 schools with 774 teachers and
40,744 students, requiring $769,000 in cash and supplies in 1866. AMmUCAN FREED-
MAN 9 (1866).
129. Typical is a report from one teacher: "Every member of my school subscribed
without any hesitation to the third clause, relating to profanity; and all but three have
now taken the first pledge, relating to intoxicating drinks. But the tobacco clause is
the lion hardest to overcome." AMmCAN FREDMAN 26 (1866).
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this is an important element in the social psychology from which the
fourteenth amendment emerged. In this philosophy, of course, schools
should be mixed rather than segregated. The constitution of the
American Freedmen's and Union Commission, a central agency for
these educational societies, specifically provided that "No schools or
supply depots shall be maintained from the benefits of which any per-
son shall be excluded because of color."1 0
Like the objects of many of the rest of the pre-Civil War crusades,
commingled education was easier to dream than to achieve. 3' At the
close of the war Negroes were excluded from education altogether in
states both north and south. The first task was to achieve any kind of
Negro education, and in the South efforts to do even this were some-
times met by violence or ostracism.132
As will be shown, there is room for substantial difference of opinion
concerning the dominant intent of the Reconstruction as to mixed
schools; but it does seem clear that if the schools were to be sep-
arate, genuine equality was required. Governor Morton of Indi-
ana, at the same time that he recommended ratification by his state of
the amendment, recommended that the state terminate its policy of
barring Negroes from public education and that tax funds proportion-
ate with their number be allocated for their benefit.133  On the specific
ground that the South was not offering opportunities for Negro educa-
tion, Representative Donnelly sponsored an amendment to the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill to permit the Bureau to aid education: "[W]e must
make all the citizens of the country equal before the law . . . [and]
we must offer equal opportunities to all men."' 34  Senator Howe, in
130. Id. at 18.
131. At the same time, the whole psychology of the period must be seen in terms
of the starry-eyed hopefulness with which the abolitionists approached the educational
task. They objected to the name of "The Freedman's Spelling Book" because it im-
plied that freedmen were a class apart. Id. at 32. A Miss Mary Hosmer, who ran a
mixed school of sixty students at Summerville, S.C., became a heroine of the organiza-
tion and her story was told under the triumphant heading, "It can be done." Id. at
76. Extended instructions were prepared on just how the teachers should handle
mixed schools, id. at 38, and the New England Freedmen's Aid Society listed as one
of its primary objectives, "To encourage white children to come into our schools, if
they show any willingness to do so." Id. at 173. The fact is that few whites attended
mixed schools during Reconstruction. Boyd, Some Phases of Educational History in
the South since 1865 in Srturms iN SouTHERN IsTORY & POLIICS 257 (1964).
132. McPHnasoN's ScRAPBoox, CvIL RIGHTs BILL OF 1866, at 10.
133. 9 BRnv. LEG. RFP. 20, 26 (Ind. 1867).
134. CoNo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1966).
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one of the leading Senate addresses in support of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment, explained in detail that the equal protection
clause would illegalize a Florida system whereby Negroes paid taxes
for educational purposes without getting full benefits in return.'35
The confused picture in respect to mixed schools from 1865 to 1875
is a product of several factors. In the first place, there was genuine
difference of opinion in the North on the merits. To the abolitionists,
to New England, and to the Freedmen's Aid Societies, it was clear
that equality banned compulsory segregation. Yet to Governor Mor-
ton, also a good Republican, the schools in his state should remain
separate "in the present state of public opinion.'"136 In the second
place, so long as the South made going to school optional, collisions
were avoided by voluntary choices. Although the Freedmen's Aid
Society threw its schools open to anyone who chose to come, it was
only occasionally that white students attended. In the third place, the
issue was a difficult one and its resolution could usually be postponed
without the necessity of decision.
One measure of the contemporary radical attitude of the require-
ment of equality can be seen in the acts of the reconstruction govern-
ments in the South. In each reconstruction convention, mixed schools
were debated, and in South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi and Louisi-
ana they were authorized. The South Carolina constitution, for ex-
ample, provided that all public schools "shall be free and open to
all . . . without regard to race or color."'3 7  In the debate on this
clause, opposition was expressed on the ground that the whites would
not attend under such circumstances; the answer was made that this
was a necessary part of securing to everyone his full political and civil
equality. 138
135. Id. at 219 (app.).
136. See note 133 supra.
137. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 10 (1868).
138. 2 W. FLEMiNG, supra note 75, at 187-89. Southerners seem to have held the
view that "equality" required unsegregated education. In 1873 a group of Louisiana
conservatives, headed by General P. T. Beauregard and determined to try to end Re-
construction by making full compliance with the demands of the war amendments, rec-
ommended "that hereafter no distinction shall exist among citizens of Louisiana
in any of our public schools or State institutions of education." The movement found-
ered largely because of adverse reaction among upstate Democrats. See Williams,
The Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873, 11 J. SouTnEN HIST. 349 (1945).
In addition to the provisions on education, these constitutions contained general
provisions guaranteeing, "equal civil and political rights and public privileges," ALA.
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The attitude of Congress toward mixed schools in the reconstructed
states prior to the consideration of the Civil Rights Bill of 1875 was
inconclusive. When Arkansas was to be readmitted, Senator Hender-
son offered an amendment to the enabling bill which would have per-
mitted the state to establish separate schools, but it lost, 5 to 30.10
Language which seems to have been incompatible with separate
schools passed the Senate but was finally lost. 140  On the other hand,
in the bill to readmit six other states in 1868 the school problem was
carefully left alone after obvious deliberations; and no state constitu-
tion approved by Congress as "in conformity with the Constitution of
the United States in all respects" provided for segregated schools. 4'
The dominant view seems to have been Trumbull's: the proper pro-
tection of freedmen was assured by giving them the ballot, which was
required in each instance.142
The District of Columbia was one place where segregation in schools
was primarily the problem of Congress. As rapidly as the slaves were
freed, schools were established for them in the District, and by 1864
the statutes provided for a proportional distribution of funds. 43  Thus
before the equality movement began its post-war activity, separate
schools in the District were already a going institution which the radi-
cals were never quite able to upset.
In the movement to remove racial discrimination in the District,
leadership fell to Sumner, and he had to place the various remedies in
their proper order. A year after the fourteenth amendment passed
CONST. art. I, § 2 (1867); or "the same" rights and privileges, LA. CONST. art. 2
(1868); or prohibiting "distinctions" on account of race or color, S.C. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 39 (1868). There were instances of a prohibition on discrimination in places of
business or public resort, LA. CoNsT. art. 13 (1868); and a prohibition on distinctions
in public institutions, Miss. CONST. art. I, § 21 (1868).
139. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2748 (1868).
140. Id. at 2901, 2904.
141. Id. at 2858. In most of the reconstruction constitutional conventions, pro-
posals were made to require or to prohibit separate schools. In seven the constitution
as adopted contained no specific provision on this point. In Louisiana and South
Carolina the constitution required mixed schools, and in Florida the requirement was
implied. See LA. CONST. arts. 135, 136 (1868); S.C. CONST. art. 10, § 10 (1868);
FLA. CONsT. art. 9, § 1 (1868). None required separate schools. See generally
Supplemental Brief for the United States on reargument as Amicus Curiae, at 72-76,
97-98, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2602 (1868). "They have got it now, and
they will not give it up. They will protect themselves."
143. Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 156, § 18, 13 Stat. 191.
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Congress, a Negro still could not hold office or be a juror in the Dis-
trict. Sumner chose first to eliminate these restrictions.14 4  With two
pocket vetoes delaying this statute, it was not until 1870 that Sumner
reached the District school question on his agenda. He introduced a
bill "to secure equal rights in the public schools in Washington"
which was reported out of the District Committee but was not con-
sidered. 45
Later in that Congress, Sumner secured an amendment in Commit-
tee to a District school bill, providing that "no distinction on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude shall be made in the
admission of pupils in any of the schools under the control of the
Board of Education.' 46  The amendment precipitated general Senate
discussion. Though he professed complete agreement with its princi-
ple, Patterson, the author of the bill, asked that the amendment be
deleted on the ground that it was impolitic. Harris of Louisiana sup-
ported Sumner on constitutional grounds, saying, "We have adopted
the principle of equality in the Constitution of the United States, and I
think this is a proper place to enact a law in accordance therewith."
Sumner contended that intermingling in schools would work satisfac-
torily, as it had in transportation. In any case, equality required it:
"Every child, white or black, has a right to be placed under precisely
the same influences, with the same teachers, in the same school room,
without any discrimination founded on color." Sawyer argued that
the amendment was required in the name of equality, and Wilson
agreed.1 47
Harris and Sawyer were "reconstructed Southerners" and could be
expected to echo Sumner. An independent thought came when Matt
Carpenter of Wisconsin, one of the foremost constitutional lawyers in
the Senate, added his view:
Mr. President, we have said by our constitution, we have said by our
statutes, we have said by our party platforms, we have said through the
political press, we have said from every stump in the land, that from
this time henceforth forever, where the American flag floats, there shall
144. Sumner expressed his intention to clean up the District of Columbia problems
one at a time. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1867).
145. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3273 (1870) (S. 361).
146. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1053 et seq. (1871) (S. 1244).
147. The statements referred to in the text are found in the debates, id. at 1054,
1055, 1058, 1061.
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be no distinction of race or color or on account of previous condition of
servitude, but that all men, without regard to these distinctions, shall
be equal, undistinguished before the law. Now, Mr. President, that
principle covers this whole case. 148
According to Carpenter, it was absurd to draw the line at the school-
room after Negroes had been given the right to vote, to serve on juries,
and to become judges. He insisted that there was no question of
social equality, for in the management of a public institution distinc-
tions of color could not be made. The bill, however, was put aside
without action of any sort.
In 1872 Sumner brought a similar proposal to the floor of the
Senate, but its opponents again caused the measure to be dropped.
Sumner then turned to his general civil rights bill, which forbade seg-
regation in schools and elsewhere throughout the nation, including the
District. The District problem was thus merged with the question of
segregation in schools generally.
Final consideration of mixed schools during Reconstruction came in
connection with the Civil Rights Act of 1875. More than any other
major measure of reconstruction, this bill was Sumner's.1 4  It was a
bill to forbid segregation in conveyances, theaters, inns, and schools.
The core of the Sumner position on segregation, as he expressed it
in the course of debate, was this:
Then comes the other excuse, which finds Equality in separation.
Separate hotels, separate conveyances, separate theaters, separate
schools, separate institutions of learning and science, separate churches,
and separate cemeteries-these are the artificial substitutes for Equal-
ity; and this is the contrivance by which a transcendent right, involving
transcendent duty, is evaded. . . . Assuming what is most absurd to
assume, and what is contradicted by all experience, that a substitute
can be an equivalent, it is so in form only and not in reality. Every
such attempt is an indignity to the colored race, instinct with the spirit
of Slavery, and this decides its character. It is Slavery in its last ap-
pearance.150
148. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1056 (1871).
149. This measure, which was the last serious effort of the abolition movement to
control the country's policy toward Negroes, occupied Sumner's efforts for four years.
Almost his last words, as he lay dying and semiconscious in his home in Washington,
surrounded by white and colored friends, were "Don't let it fail, my bill, the Civil Rights
Bill." W. SHOTWELL, LIFE OF CHARLES SUMNER 717 (1910).
150. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382, 383 (1872) (emphasis added).
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Sumner introduced his bill at three sessions in 1870 and 1871. In
1872 he momentarily attached it to an amnesty bill for Confederates
with the deciding vote of Vice-President Colfax being cast in its favor;
but since the amnesty measure required a two-thirds vote by virtue of
section 3 of the fourteenth amendment, the Democrats were able to de-
feat it in order to avoid the civil rights provisions. 151 Sumner was
away from the Senate for the first part of the year 1873. In December
of that year, he introduced the measure for the last time, and it passed
the Senate shortly after his death in 1874.152
The debate over the measure which eventually became the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 resulted in the most thorough analysis of the segre-
gation problem during the Reconstruction. Sumner himself rested
the claim for the legality of such legislation on both the thir-
teenth and the fourteenth amendments, claiming that the right not to be
segregated was both a privilege of a citizen and an aspect of equal-
ity. 1' 3 A contemporary Ohio Supreme Court decision which had up-
held separate schools in that state was urged upon the Senate as sound,
but was specifically repudiated by the floor leader for the bill.154 The
case in which Sumner had originally presented his views on equality in
the schools, Roberts v. Boston, was cited by the opposition without
persuasive effect.1 5 After Sumner's death, Frelinghuysen of New Jer-
sey, as new floor leader for the bill, declared that separate schools
should be tolerated only if voluntarily accepted by both races. He re-
jected the possibility that separate schools would ever in fact be equal,
saying, "we know that if we establish separate schools for colored peo-
ple, those schools will be inferior to those for the whites."'" 6
151. For a summary of these events, see W. SHOTWELL, supra note 149, at 200,
675 et seq. On one occasion, while Sumner was absent, the Democrats did accept
such a compromise proposal where the school section was deleted. See CoNG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3729-42 (1872).
152. 2 CONG. REc. 4176 (1874).
153. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872).
154. State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871), was specifically
disavowed by Senator Frelinghuysen. 2 CONG. REC. 3452 (1874). The Supreme
Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 545 (1896), upholding the validity
of a segregated transportation system, relied on McCann and Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass.
(5 Cush.) 198 (1850), in reaching its result, and did not mention a contemporary Iowa
case, Clark v. Board of Directors, 224 Iowa 266 (1868), also discussed by Senator
Frelinghuysen, which points in an opposite direction.
155. CONo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3261 (1872).
156. 2 CONG. REc. 3452 (1874).
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After Sumner's death, it was generally accepted that the basis of the
bill was the equal protection clause. Frelinghuysen declared that the
bill sought "freedom from all discrimination before the law on account
of race, as one of the fundamental rights of United States citizenship."
At the point when he was most precisely dealing with his claimed au-
thority, he said: "We have the right, in the language of the Constitu-
tion, to give 'to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
the equal protection of the laws.' M57
With Sumner's death, Edmunds of Vermont became the ablest of
the New England school of constitutionalists. He declared that if the
segregation principle triumphed, communities might decide that "the
foreign born shall be taught in one house by one teacher and the native
born in another." To take such a view, he said, would permit segre-
gation of Catholics from Protestants, of Methodists from Congrega-
tionalists. He rejected "the slave doctrine that color and race are rea-
sons for distinction among citizens. 168
The foregoing expressions should not mislead the reader into think-
ing that the New England position was the dominant one among those
who carried the Civil Rights Act in the Senate. That New England
point of view, in essence, was that separate schools necessarily bred in-
tolerance and should not be permitted even if both races desired it.
However, the work of the Freedmen's Commission had in fact resulted
in the existence of schools which Negroes attended and whites did not;
and in cases where the entire population was willing to accept separate
schools, the majority was willing to let them do so. It was thus con-
templated that separate schools would be forbidden by law but that if
whole communities chose to waive their rights -under the statute, there
would be no one to complain. 9
The critical judgment of the Senate on the school question came on
an amendment by Sargent which would have permitted separate but
equal schools. On May 22, 1874, that amendment failed, 26 to 21,
the majority including Senators Boutwell, Conkling, and Morrill, all
three of whom had been members of the committee which drafted the
fourteenth amendment.160 The next day the bill itself passed the
157. Id. at 3451.
158. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (1872).
159. "[LIet the individuals and not the superintendent of schools judge of the com-
parative merits of the schools .... " 2 CONG. REc. 4151 (1874) (statement of Sena-
tor Howe).
160. Id. at 4167.
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Senate by a vote of 29 to 16, with nine of the majority being members
who had participated in the passage of the fourteenth amendment.''
The passage of the Civil Rights Act by the Senate represents a
contemporary constitutional judgment that segregation in conveyances,
theaters, inns, and schools violated either the privileges and immuni-
ties clause or the equal protection clause. While reference was fre-
quently made to both provisions, the total impression of the debate is
that the violation was thought by most to be of equal protection.
162
It is important that the bill as passed was restricted to regulations of
institutions which were direct creatures of the law, as schools, and
those which were thought of as having common law duties to take all
comers, as inns and carriers, or were traditionally subject to regula-
tion, as theaters. Sumner's original proposal had included churches
and cemeteries, to which Carpenter had successfully led the opposition
on constitutional grounds. 6 3  This abandonment, of course, may have
represented a judgment as much of politics as of law, but it does repre-
sent the continued judgment of the decade that equal protection did
not extend to purely personal relationships with no common law base.
The result in the House was a different story. Almost a year
elapsed between the time of consideration in the Senate and in the
House. In that interim there was sufficient change of sentiment to
cause the House to delete the school clause, and the measure passed
onto the statute books without it. The provisions forbidding separate
conveyances, inns and theaters and requiring equality in jury service
remained.' 64
161. Id. at 4176. H. FLACK, supra note 12, at 270-71, lists Allison, Boutwell,
Conkling, Edmunds, Howe, Morrill of Vermont, Stewart, Washburne, and Windom.
162. The clauses neither should nor can be completely torn apart. They are, after
all, parts not only of one plan, but of one sentence. It was perfectly natural, there-
fore, for Senator Carpenter to believe in "equal protection" of one's "privileges
and immunities." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1872). During the de-
bates on the various proposals which finally emerged as the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
greater reliance naturally was placed on the privileges and immunities clause before
it was gutted by the decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, 830 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873). Thereafter a shift in debate occurred toward reliance on equal protection.
163. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 758-67 (1872). Carpenter's point of view
as to cemeteries is of particular interest. An argument had been made that any in-
corporated private business was sufficiently the creature of the law to be subject to the
fourteenth amendment. He rejected this view, contrasting schools where he thought
Congress would prohibit segregation, and private cemeteries which must be left alone.
Id. at 763.
164. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335.
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The House had on a previous occasion voted to require mixed
schools165 and the judgment on this occasion to omit that requirement
was the product of many factors. The principal new element seems to
have been the position of the George Peabody Fund. Peabody, an
American merchant who founded what eventually became J.P. Mor-
gan & Co., established a fund of over $3,000,000 to aid education in
the South. As the Freedmen's Aid Societies ran out of money and
collapsed, the Peabody Fund became the only major outside agency
aiding southern education. While the Civil Rights Bill was pending,
the Fund took the position that it would withdraw its aid where mixed
schools were required. The principal historian of the Fund claims
that this materially contributed to the change in the bill.' 66 Coupled
with the pressure from the Fund was the repeated assurance from south-
ern representatives that they would end their newly founded public
school systems if the Senate measure passed.10 7  Perhaps for these
reasons, as well as others, a leading Negro representative from South
Carolina consented to eliminating the school clause in return for as-
surances that the rest of the bill would pass. 168
165. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2074-75 (1872) (H.R. 1647).
166. As early as 1870, Dr. Sears, director of the funds, announced that where
mixed schools were required and white children did not attend, it would help pro-
vide separate education for white children, 2 W. FLEMINo, supra note 75, at 194.
In 1874 Sears wrote a friend detailing the manner in which he had lobbied against
the school provision in the Civil Rights Bill, relating interviews with House members,
Senators, and finally President Grant. In Sear's presence, Grant told Butler, who was
eventually in charge of the Bill in the House, that "it was unwise to attempt to force
mixed schools on the South." J. CURRY, BRIEF SKETCH OF GEORGE PEABODY 64,
65 (1898). Sears consistently and effectively espoused the view that mixed education
was a "calamity." Id. at 60-63. The abolitionists, in turn, thought very little of him,
and one of them declared that Sears had imbibed southern prejudices. Id. at 60.
Curry, who was elected Sears's successor upon the latter's death in 1881, introduces
the topic of mixed schools in the little book from which these excerpts are taken with
the words, "Some persons, not 'to the manor born', took the lead in organizing a
crusade for the coeducation of the races." Id.
167. See, e.g., 3 CoNG. REC. 981 (1875) (statement by Representative Roberts).
He states: "[Aiccording to the purpose and intention of the Amendment as dis-
closed in the debates in Congress and in the several state legislatures and in other ways,
Congress had the Constitutional power to enact direct legislation to secure the rights of
citizens against violation by individuals as well as by States .... ." H. FLAcK, supra
note 12, at 277. Cf. B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JoiNrr COMmiTTEE OF FIF-
TEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 267-68 (1914) (indicating the great concern over pri-
vate atrocities expressed by witnesses appearing before the committee).
168. 3 CoNG. RFec. 981 (1875) (remarks of Representative Cain). Professor
Avins, disagreeing with this conclusion, argues that the threat of school closings
"was simply a makeweight argument that those against the school clause used . ..
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We conclude that it was accepted virtually unanimously by all who
supported the fourteenth amendment that it required equal schools and
that a very large number of its supporters thought that the amendment
forbade segregated schools.
5. Miscegenation. We find it impossible to reach an assured con-
clusion as to the original understanding concerning segregation in
matrimony, or the prohibition of miscegenation. Senator Reverdy
Johnson made a typical attack on the Civil Rights Bill by suggesting
that equality of the right to contract extended to the marriage con-
tract and thus permitted miscegenation; 69 but certainly the moderately
radical Senators Trumbull and Fessenden thought otherwise.1 0  The
abolitionists affirmatively and enthusiastically advocated miscegenation
on other occasions, but not in 1866; and such an extreme Radical as
Wilson of Massachusetts, who twenty-two years before had led the
fight on the Massachusetts anti-miscegenation law, confined his re-
marks, perhaps discreetly, to the broadest possible generalities.17
Charges that the amendment permitted miscegenation were typically
countered by the Republicans with a joke to the effect that possible
elimination of anti-miscegenation statutes was not disturbing to them
because Republicans had no intention of marrying Negroes. 72  Aside
from the campaign oratory, it appears probable that miscegenation
was so remote a possibility to the majority of persons who supported
the amendment that they never seriously thought out the relationship
of the two. 1
73
Avins, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Four-
teenth Amendment From the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 Miss. L.J. 179, 245 (1965).
169. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866).
170. See note 63 supra.
171. See CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
172. For example, during the campaign of 1866, a Democratic meeting featured a
bevT of white beauties dressed in virginal white and carrying a placard "white hus-
bands or none." The ladies became the objects of considerable humor concerning
their prospects. MCPHERSON'S SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 4.
173. Until 1967 the Supreme Court declined to review state decisions upholding the
validity of statutes forbidding interracial marriages. See Nairn v. Naim, 197 Va. 80,
87 S.E.2d 749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849,
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So.2d
114, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954). In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964), the Court invalidated a Florida statute which banned interracial cohabitation,
but declined to rule on the companion statute which prohibited interracial marriages.
Finally in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court did invalidate statutes
prohibiting miscegenation. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, giving the opinion for the Court,
determined that the debates over the Freedman's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights
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IV. "STATE ACTION," LYNCHING, AND
CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT
The interpretation commonly given the fourteenth amendment since
Reconstruction has been that it applies only to affirmative state action,
having no bearing upon discriminatory acts by private persons. 1'7 A
general judgment of this sort was so totally foreign to the conceptions
of those who passed the amendment that no real assessment of it can
be made in terms of the attitudes during Reconstruction.
The overall judgment of Reconstructionists is best illustrated by
their views on three different matters. In their minds, in addition to
affirmative discriminatory acts by the states which were clearly pro-
hibited by the amendment (for example, restrictions against Negroes
in jury service), there were these different possibilities of discrimina-
tion: (a) Discrimination by public businesses subject to a common
law duty to deal with all customers. Such a discrimination denied
equal protection because the obligation itself had its roots in law. (b)
Discrimination by private persons as to matters in which the law did
not otherwise impose a legal duty, as by exclusion from a home, a
hotel table, or a church. Such discrimination was wholly outside
the reach of the amendment. (c) Finally, there was discrimination in
the failure to enforce the law, as a result of which Negroes might be at
the mercy of persons who chose to do violence to their persons or
property.
It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the fourteenth amendment
was meant to enable Congress to legislate affirmatively in behalf of a
racial group which a state might, because it was a racial group, choose
not to protect from actions of private persons. The major discussion
of congressional power under all of the new amendments came in 1870
and 1871 with the enactment of the First and Second Enforcement
Acts, and the Third Enforcement Act, -usually known as the Ku Klux
Act.17'5
Act were inconclusive on the question of original intent. His historical analysis
ended with this judgment on the debates: "While these statements have some rele-
vance to the intention of Congress, it must be understood that they pertained to the pas-
sage of specific statutes and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional
amendment." Id. at 9.
174. W. WmLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (2d ed. 1938) accurately sum-
marizes the cases.
175. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16
Stat. 433; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
[Vol. 1972:421
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/4
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The First and Second Enforcement Acts, though they included some
legislation in support of the fourteenth amendment, such as the re-
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, were predominantly aimed
at protection of the right to vote in enforcement of the fifteenth amend-
ment. However, the language of the fifteenth amendment, "[t]he right
1 * * to vote shall not be denied by . . . any State," raises the same
state action" problems as does the language of the fourteenth, "no
State . . . shall deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the
laws." What is important is that Congress construed the fifteenth
amendment, after extended discussion, as warranting legislation
against individual interference with the right to vote and included pro-
visions to that effect. It was fully recognized that if "denial" in the
fifteenth amendment extended to acts of omission to enforce by the
states, it had the same effect in the fourteenth amendment. 176 The
First Enforcement Act, passed within two years after the fourteenth
amendment was ratified and in the same year that the fifteenth amend-
ment was ratified, was carried in the Senate by 48 to 11 and in the
House by 133 to 58. It would be hard to imagine a clearer contem-
porary construction.
Extended contemporary debate on whether individual violence could
violate the fourteenth amendment came in March, 1871, when Presi-
dent Grant asked for control of the Klan. 177 The resultant legislation,
sponsored by Representative Shellabarger of Ohio, contained many
provisions and a variety of civil and criminal penalties against indi-
vidual acts. The extremest passage was section 3, providing that
"where insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or con-
spiracies" should hinder the execution of the state's laws, and the state
should for any reason fail to enforce the laws, "such facts will be
deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws."
The President was authorized to use military force to correct the situ-
ation.
The Ku Klux Bill passed with large majorities after discussion
which thoroughly explored the question of power. Perhaps the ablest
argument against the claimed power was made by Trumbull, who had
left the Radicals over the Johnson impeachment issue and who in his
176. A summary of the joint discussion of the "denial" problem in the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments is set forth in HL FLACK, supra note 12, at 218 et seq.
177. Message of Mar. 23, 1871, in 7 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPiLATON OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 127 (1898).
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address on this issue accurately foretold the position the Supreme Court
was to take on most of the issues of interpretation of the war amend-
ments.1
8
The prevailing view, however, was that a state denied equal protec-
tion when it permitted repeated outrages against one class in the com-
munity. It was concisely put by Representative Hoar: "It is an ef-
fectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any
class of officers charged under the laws with their administration per-
manently and as a rule refuse to extend that protection.""' 9 Or, as it
was said by Senator Frelinghuysen: "A State denies equal protection
whenever it fails to give it. Denying includes inaction as well as ac-
tion." 8
0
Bingham, vigorously claiming that he was the author of the relevant
passages of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, made an extended
address explaining every aspect of his handiwork.' 8 ' The most con-
crete measure of his position on the subject is that he himself intro-
duced a substitute for the Ku Klux Bill before the House sub-
stantially all of which went into the final legislation. He completely
endorsed the theory that by the fifth section of the amendment, Con-
gress could reach acts of omission as well as those of commission.
The central point is too simple to warrant much exposition. By
their words and votes, a decided majority of the members of Congress
in 1871 recorded their opinion that a state denied equal protection of
the laws when it tolerated widespread abuses against a class of citizens
because of their color without seriously attempting to protect them by
enforcing the law. The best answer to the question whether the con-
178. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 575 et seq. (1871). This debate is an
extraordinarily lucid constitutional discussion. Illustrative of the range of opinion on
the enforcement power are the remarks of Representative McHenry, denying its ex-
istence, id. at 429; Representative Poland, and Representative Garfield, expressing
doubts, id. at 149 (App.), but voting for the bill. The Garfield address is of
substantial importance as a direct attack from a responsible Republican on an im-
portant part of Bingham's theory of the fourteenth amendment.
179. Id. at 334. See also address of Senator Pratt. Id. at 502, 503, 506.
180. Id. at 501.
181. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 81-86 (app. 1871). On the basis of a con-
sideration of substantially all of Bingham's congressional utterances between 1860
and the termination of his service in Congress in 1873, we conclude that he was
an able congressman with a strong egocentricity and a touch of the windbag. As a
legal thinker he was not in the same class with the top-notch minds of his time, such
as Reverdy Johnson, Lyman Trumbull, Matt Carpenter or George Edmunds in the
Senate or George Hoar in the House.
[Vol. 1972:421
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temporaries of the fourteenth amendment thought it permitted legisla-
tion against lynching is that they passed just such legislation.
Contemporaries of the fourteenth amendment assumed that affirma-
tive legislation by Congress would have a place in the enforcement of
the amendment, an assumption which judicial decisions have subse-
quently denied. It was vaguely contemplated, of course, that on oc-
casion there would be appeals to the Supreme Court from state judicial
proceedings in which equal protection was denied,s 2 but the real reach
of the section was anticipated to be through measures such as the vari-
ous civil rights acts passed or contemplated.
Enough has been said concerning the contemplated function of fed-
eral legislation in respect to discriminations in the affirmative operation
of the law. The question remains how extensive the federal enforce-
ment power was thought to be when a state failed in specific instances
to enforce its laws.
No clear-cut answer to that question emerges from the reconstruction
decade because that question was never before the country. The
country did not conceive of itself as confronted with petty municipal
and local problems, but rather with large scale violence against a racial
group in which state governments appeared to acquiesce.
Answers were offered, however, by two members of the radical
group of outstanding legal ability and integrity, Senator Edmunds and
Representative George F. Hoar. Speaking about the limitation of the
power of Congress to maintain a republican form of government,
Hoar used words which he doubtless considered equally applicable to
the power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment:
Criminals escape punishment in Massachusetts and Vermont. A
railroad company does not stand a fair chance for an impartial verdict
before a Wisconsin jury. Is Congress to interfere?. . . We cannot in-
terfere to deal with the incidental evils which attend upon republican
government; but we should interfere where, we being the judges wheth-
er the case exists or not, on our oaths responsible to the great tribunal
of the American people, wherever these evils have attained such a de-
gree as amounts to the destruction, to the overthrow, to the denial to
182. See, e.g., the remarks of Lieutenant Governor Greene of Rhode Island in the
state senate on January 30 and 31, 1867, arguing that the amendment would slightly,
but only slightly, increase the federal appellate jurisdiction. Pamphlet, Providence
Daily Journal Press 1867 (Lib. Cong.).
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large classes of the people of the blessings of republican government al-
together.183
Edmunds approached the problem more directly by pointing out that
legislation must be aimed not merely at discriminatory law enforce-
ment, but at discriminations for a reason forbidden by the clause. Con-
gress, he explained, could not penalize interferences with the equal
administration of justice if it were merely the result of a private feud.
It could deal with the situation if there were discrimination because a
man was "a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or
because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter.' 18 4
The answer which Hoar's and Edmund's contemporaries probably
would have given to the question emerges from their observations.
Congress could legislate to correct state failures to enforce their own
laws where the failure was of considerable magnitude and where the
reason for the failure was racial, religious, or perhaps political bias.
V. THE PLACE OF HISTORY
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments were the new
constitution which emerged from the Second American Revolution.
Drafted and carried to ratification by a group of stem and willful men,
they were intended to make complete changes in the American politi-
cal system and to facilitate an economic revolution. One may easily
challenge the wisdom of this Second American Constitution by assert-
ing that it permitted the federal government to reach unprecedentedly
far into the internal affairs of the states, giving enormous discretion to
Congress; but the challenge to wisdom is no challenge to the fact that
this was exactly what was intended. The Second American Constitu-
tion gave no greater power to the federal government than, for exam-
ple, the commerce clause gave in the first American Constitution.
The differentiating factors in the fates of these two American con-
stitutions were these: the economic and political elements that made
up a major part of the original force behind the war amendments
eventually found that the policies they once espoused were no longer
useful to them,18 5 while the original Constitution had the consistent
support of the wealthy class. Moreover, the original Constitution was
183. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 333, 334 (1871).
184. Id. at 567.
185. Hesseltine, Economic Factors in Abandonment of Reconstruction, 22 Miss.
VAL. HIsT. REv. 191 (1935).
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interpreted by a Court determined to maximize its underlying pur-
poses, while the war amendments came to a Court inclined to con-
strue them narrowly. 1 6 But vastly the most important difference was
that the war amendments, unlike the original Constitution, were thrust
by force upon a community whose deepest mores they outraged. The
net result was that the industrialist element in the original movement
for the fourteenth amendment eventually found it considerably more to
their liking than they had ever anticipated, but the element in the
movement which had desired to use all three of the war amendments
to create an America in which all citizens were truly equal was se-
riously disappointed.
When Chief Justice Warren came to the Supreme Court he found
himself confronted with the great issue of segregation in the public
schools. In the spring preceding his appointment, the Court had
asked for reargument of the school cases in highly historical terms.
Five questions were asked by the Court, 8 7 the first two being:
186. An admirer of the work of the Court says happily in respect of the reconstruc-
tion cases: "They marked the practical overthrow of the Congressional ideal for
the Fourteenth Amendment within seven years after its victorious adoption. The Su-
preme Court thus at the outset practically annulled Section Five of the Amendment,
and reduced the bill of rights section one to distant potentialities." C. CoLLINS, THE
FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 22, 23 (1912). See also Collins, Con-
stitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil Rights Program, 44 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1949).
Lower court opinions moved in the same direction. Charge to Grand Jury-Civil
Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005 (No. 18,260) (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875); Charge to Grand
Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999 (No. 18,258) (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875);
Texas v. Gaines, 23 F. Cas. 869 (No. 13,847) (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874) (opinion
by Bradley foreshadowing Civil Rights Cases). Three cases are forerunners of the
Supreme Court's approval of "separate but equal", Greene v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F.
Cas. 1090 (No. 5754) (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1879); Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 F. Cas.
294 (No. 1361) (C.C.D. La. 1878); United States v. Dodge, 25 F. Cas. 882 (No.
14,976) (D.C.W.D. Tex. 1877). Contra, United States v. Newcomer, 27 F. Cas.
127 (No. 15,868) (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1876) (upholding validity of Civil Rights Acts of
1875 as applied to hotels). For leading state cases on segregated schools during
this period, see State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871), followed in,
State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872). But cf. Clark v. Board of Di-
rectors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
The one fairly consistent judicial adherent to the original plan of the war amend-
ments was Mr. Justice Harlan, whose position is reviewed in Clark, The Constitutional
Doctrines of Justice Harlan in 33 JoHNs HOPKINS UNIVmRsrry STUDIES 405 (1915),
and in Watt and Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL.
L. REV. 13 (1949). Oddly enough, Harlan almost failed of confirmation to his Su-
preme Court seat because of fears in some quarters that he would not be sufficiently
radical. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles
and Politics, 1941 Wis. L. R.v. 172, 207-10.
187. Gebhart v. Belton, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and
the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the fourteenth
amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did
not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying
the fourteenth amendment understood that compliance with it would
require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was
it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the amendment,
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under section 5 of the Amendment abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such segregation
of its own force?
Suddenly legal historians became popular as all sides sought to give
answers.18  The purely historical discussion ran to hundreds of pages
of learned research as the old-time greats, Bingham, Howard, Sumner,
and the rest, returned from their graves to enliven argument.
After all that historical effort, Chief Justice Warren in Brown v.
Board of Education concluded to discard the history and rest his opin-
ion on other grounds. He said: "The most avid proponents of the
post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United
States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both
the letter and spirit of the amendments and wished them to have the
most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures
had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty."'
Noting that public education of Negroes was almost nonexistent at the
time of the amendment's adoption, he concluded that, "[W]e cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted ....
We must consider public education in light of its full development and
its present place in American life throughout the Nation." 00
Warren never felt that the historical material was better than incon-
188. The historical team for the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People was headed by the widely respected constitutional historian, Alfred
Kelly, author with W. Harbison of ThE AMmcAN CONSTITUTION (1948 and later
editions), supported by John P. Frank. The earlier form of this essay was liberally
used.
189. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
190. Id. at 492-93.
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elusive;' 9' and pure history, deeply considered, has not a large place in
any part of the constitutional civil rights debates in the Supreme Court
since Brown. A somewhat more than casual historical discussion by
Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell v. Maryland,9 ' a public accom-
modations case, drew a historical dissent from Justice Black. 193 His-
torical analysis reached its most comprehensive development when the
Court moved away from schools to the legislative apportionment cases.
Giving "one man, one vote" a basis in the understanding of the recon-
struction decade requires an effort, to say the least of it; and Justice
Harlan made devastating use of historical materials in his objections. 94
The recent study of Professor William Van Alystyne to the contrary
badly shakes up some of the Harlan history and gives a somewhat dif-
ferent total picture, but the weight of the whole history remains with
Harlan.195
191. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
192. 378 U.S. 226, 286, 293-305 (1964). For discussion, see C. MiLLER, THm Su-
PrEam COURT AND THE UsEs OF HISTORY ch. VI (1969).
193. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 335-40 (1964) (dissent).
194. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dissent). The Court, without ref-
erence to history, held that the equal protection clause requires every state to struc-
ture its legislature so that all the members of each house represent substantially the
same number of people. Mr. Justice Harlan in a vigorous dissent assailed the Court's
"... failure to address itself at all to the fourteenth amendment as a whole or to the
legislative history of the amendment pertinent to the matter at hand." Id. at 590.
His review of the legislative history surrounding the amendment brought him to the con-
clusion that section 2 precluded section 1 from having any effect on suffrage. As to
the House debates, he noted: "In the three days of debate ... every speaker on
the resolution, with a single doubtful exception, assumed without question that,
as Mr. Bingham said . . . 'the second section excludes the conclusion that by the
first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law.' This assumption was neither
inadvertent nor silent. Much of the debate concerned the change in the basis of rep-
resentation effected by the second section, and the speakers stated repeatedly, in ex-
press terms or by unmistakable implication, that the states retained the power to regu-
late suffrage within their borders." Id. at 599. He arrived at a similar conclusion on
the Senate debates as well. Id. at 601-02. Mr. Justice Harlan also examined the cir-
cumstances attending ratification of the amendment by the states and readmission of
the states. He argued that the "loyal" states, many of which had skewed apportion-
ment schemes, never would have ratified the amendment had they understood it to
render their own constitutions unconstitutional. See id. at 602-04. And he noted that
six of the ten readmitted states had some form of unbalanced apportionment in their
constitutions, but nevertheless were admitted. Id. at 606. Thus he concluded: "It is
incredible that Congress would have exacted ratification of the fourteenth amendment
as the price of admission, would have studied the state constitutions for compliance
with the amendment, and would then have disregarded violations of it." Id. at 607.
195. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and The
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33. For discussion
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There are a few other historical references. The scope of section 5,
the authorization of congressional legislation to enforce the amend-
ment, has interested Justice Brennan; 19 and Justice Stewart used the
1866 Civil Rights Act as support for the view that the thirteenth
amendment gave Congress some power over discrimination in sales of
property.197
The effect of the course of decision has been to put historical analysis
of original intention of the fourteenth amendment into a secondary
role, helpful or illuminating on occasion, but short of controlling.
This course by the Supreme Court seems inescapable wisdom.
There is no escaping the fact, developed earlier, that the counterrevo-
lution ending Reconstruction did wipe out the anticipated scope of all
three of the Civil War amendments. The course of social and political
life and of interpretation twisted the fourteenth amendment in particu-
lar beyond even a likely possibility of recognition by its sponsors.
A judge who picked up the problems of the 1950's was thus con-
fronted with two absolutely conflicting histories. He had the history
of 1866 to 1875. He also had the reversing history of 1875 to, say,
1954. The judge in 1954 was not a historical puzzle-solver, fascinated
with the long-terminated truth of Who Was Shakespeare?, or Who
Killed the Prince in the Tower? He needed instead to relate living
problems to living law. If one did have a sure answer to intent in the
1860's, which on marginal problems is hard to find, he might still
wisely be reluctant to vault over seventy-nine years of conflicting sub-
sequent history to embrace the purpose of the first ten.
Some clauses of the Constitution permit a concept of truly historical
growth, no matter how different the present is from the past. But
the fourteenth amendment had no historical growth; it was absolutely
cut off and replaced by a fresh start after the mid-1870's. Chief Jus-
tice Warren used great good judgment when he dropped the historical
inquiry as profitless and turned to other sources of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
For whatever utility it may have, and for the sake of intellectual in-
and references to other writers on the Harlan history, see C. MILLER, supra note 192, ch.
VII, and particularly discussion and notes at 128-29.
196. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 (1966); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 774 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
197. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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quiry on a great theme, it is possible to know, at least generally, what
equal protection meant in its original conception in the reconstruction
decade. Closer than this we cannot come; the extreme volatility of
this revolutionary era means that understandings may have altered
between passage of the amendment in 1866, its ratification in 1868,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Our interpretations are those of
the reconstruction decade, wherever that evidence may be, and not the
interpretation of any particular year.
The equal protection clause was, with the foregoing qualification,
originally understood to mean the following: All men, without regard
to race or color, should have the same rights to acquire real and per-
sonal property and to enter into business enterprises; 98 criminal and
civil law, in procedures or penalties, should make no distinctions what-
soever because of race or color;199 there should be no segregation of
individuals on the basis of race or color as to the right to own or use
land;2"0 there should be no segregation of individuals on the basis of
race or color in the use of utilities, such as transportation or hotels;20 1
198. Decisions in accord with the text range from one of the earliest, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating discrimination against Chinese laundry-
men), to Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (invalidating a California statute
setting up racial qualifications for land ownership, some of the Court resting the de-
cision on equal protection grounds), and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) (invalidating racial restraints on fishing).
199. Accord as to juries, Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Patton v. Mis-
sissippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See also
Carsell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (reversing the conviction of a Negro because
members of his race had been intentionally excluded from the grand jury which indicted
him). It is common knowledge that there is in fact extreme discrimination against
Negroes, but by no means exclusively in the South, in every aspect of the criminal
law from arrest to sentence. 1 G. MYRDAL, supra note 96, at pt. 6.
200. Accord, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (The Restrictive Covenant Cases); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926). On the practical fashion in which geographical segregation is in fact
secured, see Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
1, 21-26 (1948); "In sum, prior to the restrictive covenant cases, Negroes in Indiana-
polis could not move out of the areas identified. That situation is in nowise changed
by the restrictive covenant cases." Id. at 26.
201. Since Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court, by
means of summary per curiam decisions, has held racial segregation invalid in nu-
merous areas. See Schiro v. Bynam, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (ordinance requiring seg-
regation in municipal auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (seg-
regated courtroom seating); Tenner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative
regulation requiring segregation in airport restaurant); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dor-
sey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (statute forbidding integrated athletic contests); Park Ir-
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with reservations, for here there is substantial divergence, there should
be no segregation in the schools.20 2  It was generally understood that
Congress could legislate to secure these ends, without regard to wheth-
er the particular objective was frustrated by state action or by state in-
action.20 3 On the other hand, the clause was meant to have no bearing
on the right to vote;204 the evidence of its contemplated effect on state
anti-miscegenation laws is unclear; 20 5 and it was generally -understood
to have no bearing on segregation of a purely private sort in situations
fairly independent of the law, as in churches, cemeteries, or private
clubs.
What has been said goes to the measure of equal protection as a rule
of law. But equal protection deserves measure as more than a rule of
law, for it represents a part of a symbol, the symbol of equality. The
enormous potentiality which made that symbol the banner of the aboli-
tionists manifested itself not only in the equal protection clause but also
in the remainder of the war amendments. The strongest advocates of
"equality before the law" in Congress during the Reconstruction
hoped to place the recent slaves, not halfway on the scale between
slavery and freedom, but at a level substantially equivalent and undis-
tinguished from that of the white population. That ultimate goal was
to be achieved through equal freedom, equal privileges and immuni-
ties, equal due process, equal rights to vote, and equal protection of
the laws.
provement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf courses);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (statute requiring segregation on buses);
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses).
202. Accord, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. Contra, Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951) (purely private conduct
beyond reach of the amendment); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (in-
validating so much of the Third Enforcement Act as applied to acts of private indi-
viduals); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (in substance con-
struing the Enforcement Act of 1870 and equal protection so as to eliminate "private
violence" from congressional control). But cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (finding state action where a
private person conspires with state officials); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
204. For discussion see note 194 supra and accompanying text.
205. Cf. cases cited note 173 supra.
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